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This research establishes an understanding of the relationship between gangsterism, the drug 
commodity and inefficiencies in the state’s policing institution, as well as the consequences 
of this relationship, in the context of Overcome squatter area in Cape Town. Overcome is 
representative of other violently impoverished Cape Town communities with its high rate of 
unemployment, low quality of education, domestic abuse, stagnant housing crisis, lack of 
access to intellectual and material resources or opportunities for personal growth, 
gangsterism, inefficient policing, substance-dependency, and violence. This research 
demonstrates that the current relationship between the gangs, drugs and the police fosters an 
unpredictable, violent environment, leaving residents in a constant state of vulnerability. 
The argument is developed around three key historical junctures in the development of 
organized crime in South Africa, starting with the growth of the mining industry in the 
Witwatersrand after 1886, followed by forced removals and prohibition like policies in Cape 
Town circa 1970, and finally the upheaval created around transition away from apartheid in 
1994.  
Research for this paper was both quantitative and qualitative in nature, and included expert 
interviews on the subjects of police criminality, narcotic sales, and gangsterism. Newspapers 
articles, crime statistics, books, census figures, and a host of journals were also utilized.  
Upon reviewing a host of police inefficiencies and criminal collusions, the research 
concludes that public criminals related to the state, such as police, and private criminals, such 
as gangsters, work together in a multitude of ways in a bid to acquire wealth, most notably 
through an illicit drug market today dominated by ‘tik’. It is shown that this violent narcotics 
market binds police and gangsters together at the expense of creating a state of insecurity for 












2 Methodological challenges .............................................................................3
3 Literature review ...........................................................................................6
3.1 Industrialisation, polarisation, and the rise of inequity........................6
3.2 Forced removals, additional black markets and the proliferation of 
drugs.........................................................................................................15
3.3 The years of transition........................................................................22
4 Seawinds at a glance ....................................................................................28
4.1 Demographics and economic indicators.............................................29


















This research aims to establish an understanding of the relationship between gangsterism, the 
drug commodity andinefficiencies in the state’s policing institution, as well asthe 
consequences of this relationship, in the context ofOvercome. Overcome is a squatter area in 
Seawinds, Cape Town,reluctantly recognised by the state in November 2005 (Independent 
Media Center, 2005).It is representative of other violently impoverished Cape Town
communities with itshigh rate of unemployment, low quality of education,domestic 
abuse,stagnant housing crisis,lack of access to intellectual andmaterial resources or
opportunities for personal growth, gangsterism, inefficient policing, substance-dependency,
and violence. It will be demonstrated that the current relationship between the gangs, drugs 
and the police fosters an unpredictable, violent environment, leaving residents in a constant 
state of vulnerability. Criminals of the underworld and those of the state are mutually 
motivated by money, regardless of the harm that comes to others, and the inseparable 
relationship between gangs, the drug commodity and police guarantees poor communities 
like Overcome exist in a state of unpredictable violence, creating a dangerous circumstance
for all who have to live within them1. 
The thesis will commence with a literature review pertaining to the factors of police 
inefficiencies, gangsterism, and the drug commodity. Historical accounts will be provided for
the development of each aspect in order to understand theircontemporary relationship to 
eachother. While the focus of research pertains to modern-day Cape Town, international 
parallels will be drawn upon in order the better understand the topic. Theories of various 
authors will integrate with each other in order to determine their strengths and weaknesses, 
while showing how they are significant to circumstances in Overcome. Thereafter an 
overview of the three factors will be given in the context of the squatter area. A symbiotic 
relationship between gangsters and police will be demonstrated, put forth that theprivate and 
public entitiesthrive off a common criminal relationship held together by financial interests 
tied to a brutal narcotics industry: a black-marketwhich breeds desperation, greed and 
violence in Overcome.
                                                            
1This state of insecurity is markedly characterized by an inability to predict when or how violence will manifest, 











Research for this thesis has made extensive use of local publicationsfrom the Institute for 
Security Studies and the Medical Research Council, international publications on the topics 
of police inefficiencies and gangsterism, as well a host of historical readings concerning the 
development of criminality in South Africa. Understanding the topic, and the formulation of 
the argument, has been greatly aided thanks to wealth of knowledge shared via interviews by 
the Cape Town criminologist Irvin Kinnes, South African social historian Charles Van 
Onselen and Western Cape policing expert Major General Jeremy Vearey. While large 
volumes of literature exist about police inefficiencies, gangsterism and the drug commodity, 
there exists very little information regarding the symbiotic relationship between the three.  
More troubling is the fact that there is even less knowledge pertaining to this relationship
within a South African context. However, the literature review will conceptualise the three 
factors, pulling on South African and international findings where relevant information is 
available. This will aid in locating the thesis both historically and topically within the context 
of the existing discourse. 
The aim of this research is to present an understanding for theconstant everyday violence in 
places like Overcome, fueled by the drug market, and made functional by the working 
relationship between gangs and the police who sanction and partake in profiting from illicit 
markets. However, this would not be possible without analysing significant events in South 
Africa which contributed to creating the current circumstances. The literature review will 
demonstrate that three key historical junctures were pivotal in fostering a criminal industry in 
South Africa which today creates indiscriminate violence in many communities. This 
historical review will commence with a brief analysis of the turn of the 20th century and the 
discovery of major gold deposits in the Witwatersrand, followed by the 1970s and the 
prohibition and criminalisation of substances as well as forced removals in Cape Town.
Finally the 1990s, as defined by the criminal pandemonium produced by the transition away 
from apartheid, will be analyzed, creating dialogue between various authors in each historical 
period in reference to police inefficiency, gangsterism, and drugs and how their working 
relationship producedviolence. Upon completion, the readers’ attention will be turned to the 
current situation in the Cape Flats and more specifically, Overcome, demonstrating how the 












The first hand information supporting this thesis was derived through unintended research 
which some may categorise as ‘ethnographic’, and which may be called ‘participant 
observation’ in social science.Two terms, which should be noted, the author was not aware of 
even after residing in Overcome for a year. For the sake of ethical considerations, it must be 
made clear that the aim of living in the community was never to further any academic 
ambitions; there was no intent to research, collect data, or write about that which was 
experienced. In short, moving to the community never had any academic purpose. In 
September, 2010, two weeks before moving into the township of Philippi with the intention
of developing social programs for at-risk youth, a chance encounter with a protest leader near 
the Parliament building in Cape Town led to a change in plans. The purpose of the 
demonstration in the Company’s Gardens was to acquire water, electricity, and basic social 
services for their deprived community. The author did not know where the community was, 
but an eagerness to learn and a desire to assist, resulted in accepting an invitation to return to 
the protesters’ community that evening. Upon arriving in what turned out to be a squatter 
areaand after spending a few days there, anothernaive decision was made: to move in to the 
communityin order to try and better understand issues in the community and ways to 
contribute to their alleviation. Many months later, after moving to a different township to 
develop youth programs, this thesis was imagined and was developed. 
There may beinherent flaws with the way data was inadvertently and retrospectivelycollected
and the charge of bias may be valid. In Overcome, the author was considered to be ‘white’. It 
was strange to be classified as such within these communities in spite of being born in Iran. 
However, the author has come to learn that he wasseen as white in Overcome due to the 
social class he comes from, the economic opportunities and capabilities he has access to, the 
languages that he speaks and the parts of the world he has lived in. He may be seen as ‘the 
other’, a wealthy person from afar. ‘Whites’, ‘Europeans’, and ‘the rich’ are synonyms to 
many who have been generationally,racially and structurally marginalised in Cape Town. 
Many imagine that the author, like the millions of historically privileged people in South 
Africa, to have infinite access to the dominant material world. The underclass may not be far 
off in their assumptions given the intellectual and material goods the privileged class, of 











supportivefamily background and career opportunities). The author’s identity, in the war 
zone2 that Overcome can be, is imperative to how the community interacts with him. Here, in 
the eyes of many, he is often seen as four things he knows himself not to be: a senseless, 
millionaire whiteman from America.
To be associated with ‘die wit man’, it was learned over time by listening carefully to the 
words of his hosts and observing their actions, is not favourable. For one,as will be 
illustrated, most ofwhat the prison gangsters have learned has been significantly influenced 
by the same Europeans they have had distain for and regard as their oppressor. Over the last 
110 or so years, everything from brutality, to the ranking and training of fighters, to the sheer 
act of robbery were imbedded into the lives of those locked within prisons and hard labour 
sites. Over time, and between incarceration and relative freedom in the urban ghettos, what 
was learned in institutions was transferred to the streets. Jan Note, a legendary figure in South 
African gangsterism who will be introduced later, as he was known before imprisonment, or 
Nongoloza thereafter, the king of the prison gangs, as the ndotas3 know him now, only 
learned to organise criminally and steal after being taught by a group of European highway 
bandits who took him in as a skilled ‘stable boy'. Violence, too, is best learned through 
experience. Perhaps as his companions had a severe distrust of white people, the same 
distrust is projected on to the author by some residents. This in turn may result in trickery and 
misinformation, especially when seasoned prison gangsters are concerned4and although the 
author was shown unimaginable kindness, warmth, generosity and support by certain 
individuals in the community, there were others who put him in danger and deceived him 
regularly.
Veteran prison gangsters, for example the 26prison gang memberthat the author eventually 
found out he had moved in with, and who, like all other 26s5, existed by the ethos of con-
                                                            
2Noting that at the time of writing in December, 2010 Overcome remained, once again, patrolled by the 
military (September, 2011)
3Zulu word for ‘man’, signifying a bona fide prison gangster in the hyper-patriarchal realm of the Number 
gangs
4In her book titled God’s Gangsters?,written after a decade of researching prison gangsters, Heather Parker 











artistry and theft, put the author in a precarious position.Given the author’s privileged 
background, he was often treated as a financial opportunity. Thus, the author sceptically
questioned the information he came by because he believed it mayhave been given to him in 
order to confuse or manipulate him for selfish ends. These interactions in themselves are 
demonstrative of the social decay that people have been brought to live in, creating mistrust
and exploitative interactions, certainly not only with the author, but also with others within 
their community. Indeed, time spent in the community illuminatedhow fragile bonds are and 
that the people the author got to know best rarely trusted anyone completely; the saying “you 
can’t trust anyone” (Standing, 2006: 121) seemed to be an established motto amongst 
Overcome residents, severely contrasting how the author fundamentally knew social 
relationships existing in his circles of privilege globally. Class outsiders, like the author, must 
be constantly aware of this uneasy reality in places like Overcome, where language, 
appearance and class-associations tend to dictate how one is perceived and treated, in order to 
be mindful enough to scrutinise information in an attempt to arrive as close to the truth as 
possible. The following section will explain how prison gangs, like the one the author’s host 
pledged allegiance to, came to exist in South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
5While gang law dictates that the 28s work with poison and the 27s take blood, the roles of the 26s gang, 
which unlike the other two original Number gangs was founded in prison, is to accumulate resources, stealing 











3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Industrialisation, polarisation, and the rise of inequity 
Nongoloza is the notorious figurehead of South Africa’s original prison gang. He became a 
hardened, violent man due to the circumstances created on the Rand at the turn of the 20th
century and his stoic stance in the face of brutality earned him growing respect amongst his 
peers. He had come to control gangs outside the prisons and inside them too. New prisoners 
were exposed to the criminal cult during incarceration and the transfer of prisoners around 
South Africa or release into their poor communities helped their criminal organisation spread. 
Today Nongoloza is legend within every South African prison population,as well as the 
communities from which the prisoners come and go, now both informed by the Number 
gangs. As the proceeding sections will demonstrate, he is an important figure in 
contemporary criminality and gang culture in South Africa’s violently impoverished 
communities.His rise to prominence about a century ago is linked directly to the drastic rise 
in inequality brought about by athriving mining industry.
The intensification of relations between government related criminals, such as those within 
the police, and private criminals, such as gangsters,was cemented in South Africa over 100 
years ago. Charles Van Onselen, author of New Babylon, New Nineveh(1982), outlines the
rise of social violence and development of organised criminality South Africa in relation to 
urbanisation in Johannesburg.  The entrenched relationship between South Africa’s policing 
institution and its criminal organisations came to be cultivated in late 19th century, a time 
historically demarcated by the discovery of vast gold deposits on the Rand. Then, like now, 
the life-blood feeding this symbiotic criminal relationship was the creation of illicit markets. 
At that time the key commodity was alcohol and its profitability was linked to acquiring 
cheap labour for the mining industry. Between 1888 and 1892 the number of liquor outlets in 
the Witwatersrand increased by almost 400%, swelling from 147 legal points of sale to 552 
(Onselen, 1982: 7). This transpired because Kruger’s government, with the help of his 
mining-tycoon allies who also controlled liquor production, operated under the belief that 
alcohol would foster a dependent, unskilled African work force, while it was ordained that 











purchased sex6 (Ibid.: 7). A keyphilosophy of the mine owners was that if the addicted miners 
spent their money on feeding their alcoholic needs they would have to work longer 
underground:
“The more money the mineworkers spent on liquor, the less they saved; and the 
less they saved, the longer they worked before returning to the peasant economies 
of their rural homelands.” (Ibid.: 55)
Onselenalso explains that “Both prostitution and drinking, therefore, partly grew out of the 
male culture that was rooted in the boarding-houses and the mine compounds” (Ibid.: 8), 
foreshadowing what inevitably contributed to a hyper-masculine prison gang culture which 
was soon to be fostered in another restrictive male institution: the penitentiary. 
However, while in the beginning substance dependency seemed like the most promising way 
to drag workers to dreary work underground, it soon proved to create an unreliable work 
force threatening economic output, with 15-25% of the workforce continuously drunk (Ibid.: 
18). Consequently, a decade after the discovery of gold on the Rand, Act No 17 of 1896 was 
made into law, prohibiting liquor sales to mine workers7 (Ibid.: 18). The government had 
created a black market which was immediately seized upon by violent Eastern European 
criminals who would not relinquish their lucrative interests. These men smuggled and sold 
mass amounts of cheap liquor to an addicted labouring class, while recruiting and importing
prostitutes to work the nearly exclusive male population. Profiting side by side with them was 
the police who made their illegal operations possible, demonstrating the first large scale 
South African operations involving police collusion with criminals who secured their markets 
through violent means (Ibid.:19). Regardless of subsequent anti-corruption, anti-gang policies 
ordained by the government, the criminal industry had gotten its proverbial foot in the door; 
the best efforts to un-corrupt the police were, at best, met with limited and temporary success 
(Ibid.: 91). The theme of black-market creation leading to gangsterism assisted by police 
criminality will be revisited regularly in the remainder of this paper as it is pivotal to
understanding the establishment of relationships between government relatedcriminalsand 
                                                            
6 Onselen observes that the government’s liquor promotion policy allowed for the rise of prostitution, noting 
“A government anxious to protect a liquor industry that benefited its most powerful constituents and a mining 
industry that sought to attract and stabilise a working class on the Witwatersrand, between them has good 
reasons for condoning this conspicuous inactivity.’” (Onselen, 1982: 8) 
7In similar fashion, until 1923 when it was made illegal for claimed reasons relating to work efficiency, mine 
owners also encouraged ‘dagga-breaks’ for their workers because they believed marijuana stimulated the 











private ones. It will also be demonstrated that this relationship, protecting illicit markets, 
breeds violence. 
Most of the global literature relating to collusion between private and public criminals comes 
out of the United States. This maybe troubling in the search for relevance that at times 
becomesstrenuous given the vastly different social and historical circumstances influencing 
criminality from one place to another. However, certain theories may be applicable globally. 
Written in 1976, Peter Manning’s and Lawrence Redlinger’s Invitational Edges of 
Corruptionis sucha theory. It explains that all industries, licit or illicit, embody a certain form 
of influence acquisition (Redlinger, 1976). Ultimately, in business, every actor has profits in 
mind, seeking to create market conditions conducive to their success. This naturally involves 
influencing decision makers. In the case of licit markets, Redlinger and Ma ning explain that 
actors advertise openly to the consumer or legally try to buy the favour of the government 
through what today is commonly referred to as lobbying (Redlinger, 1976: 3). Similarly, it 
can be argued that a person conducting a legal business who tries to buy favour with policy 
makers is not viewed in the same light as a person conducting an illegal person trying to do
the same. The authors continue to explain that those with interests in illicit businesses try to 
influence those within the state who impact on their markets. Thus, while actors in licit 
markets openly attempt to influence decision makes, players in illicit markets must try to 
surreptitiously influence those whose stated purpose it is to shut down illicit
operations(Redlinger, 1976: 4). Only by doing this could the trader in the illicit market run a 
thriving business. As such, outlaws must try to penetrate the policing institution and any other 
government apparatus threatening to diminish their profits8, while exercisingviolence, illegal 
as it may be, where it insures profits. South African criminologists like Gareth Newman and 
Ted Legget support this theory:
                                                            
8According to Tilly in Warmaking and Statemaking, states have historically created social ills for which they 
claim remedies. He writes: 
“...consider the definition of a racketeer as, someone who creates a threat, then charges for its 
reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as 
racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its 
citizens are imaginary, or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organised a 
protection racket.” (Tilly, 1982: 1)
In that the South African state banned certain commodities, creating markets and individuals thereafter 
considered to be criminal (while breeding life into state actor corruption) and then went on to expend 












“The structural constraints of legally suppressed markets expose the agent to an 
accumulation of attempted influence. Because sellers want effective control over 
their markets, they must find ways to neutralise enforcement agencies. If they 
cannot avoid at least arrest and charge and it is probable that eventually they 
cannot, then they must attempt to gain favourable influence with agents”
(Newman, 2002: 2)
While Legget writes:
“Even well established, mainstream markets have their frictions and legal 
commerce relies heavily on the dispute resolution mechanisms of the state's 
courts. These, of course, are not available when peddling drugs and violence is 
often required to sort out business disagreements” (Legget, 2002: 1) 
Manning’s and Redlinger’s theory is exemplified by South Africa’s pioneer organised 
criminals who opportunistically migrated from Europe and America to trade in lucrative 
illicit markets with the help of those ordained by the state to quell them (Onselen, 1982: 88). 
While the violence-breeding bond between police criminality and organised crime was 
brought about by the creation of black markets for illicit commodities, developments in 
Johannesburg, Africa’s first city to undergoan industrial revolution (Ibid.: 368), also bred 
criminality amongst the local population in a different way. 
Internationally, overcrowding is often linked to crime (Legget, 2002: 3).Johannesburg had a 
population of 3000 in 1887, increasing to 100,000 by 1896 (Onselen, 1982: 165). The 
mushrooming population owed its growth to migrant mine labour from rural areas. These 
labourers made functional an emerging mega-industry in which Johannesburg went from 
producing  0.16% of the world’s gold to in 1886 to 27% by 1898 (Ibid.: 1). It goes without 
saying that astronomical profits were at stake and a city was being designed to insure its 
profitability. The underclass majority had to live alongside a dominant and wealthy minority 
who constantly sought to consolidate their control over surplus labour while maximising 
profits. In an interview with Charles Van Onselen in 2012, he repeatedly reiterated that 
criminality spawns as economies “open and close” (Onselen, 2012). The mining industry 
boomed between 1890-1891, 1896-1897, and 1906-1907 and busted in between those 
years(Onselen, 1982: 3). During the booms labourers were hurried in and during busts they 
were, at best, left to their own devices. Many who lacked a way to earn turned to crime. 
Though poverty alone cannot be held solely responsible for criminality, it has always been a 
great conduit for the rise in crime. This perhaps inspired thegreat historian and banditry 











individual methods of escaping the bondage of virtual serfdom but bullying and outlawry’” 
(Hobsbawm, 1965: 38). 
Aided by industrialisation and capitalist aspirations, there were also structural designs by the 
government which attributed to mass unemployment which increased criminality. Industries 
which provided employment for the poor masses and services for the bourgeoning city were 
systematically replaced by modern versions, bankrolled by the elite who controlled the city 
and its resources. For example, in 1896 traditional brick makers were moved by the 
government miles out of town after the modern brickyards were given production priority 
(Onselen, 1982: 23, 323). Consequently, many unemployed brick makers turned to dealing in 
the illicit markets(Ibid.:38). Over 600 cabdrivers were rendered unemployed after the 
introduction of the foreign-funded electric tram in 1906, and this too had a similar affect 
(Ibid.: 41). 
The industries dominated by African workers were worst hit due to the lack of social safety 
nets, such as the Rand Aid Association created established to win favour with the white 
unemployed9 (Ibid:. 41) . Most significant was the legislation which moved the AmaWasha, a 
large group of Zulu clothing washerswho served Johannesburg’s growing population, far 
away from their source of water and urban clientele. At the same time the powerful mine 
financier Otto Beit, with the help of imperial capital and friends in government, introduced 
the steam washer to the city. Quickly thereafter the redundancy of the AmaWasha was 
established (Ibid: 22). So-called ‘house boys’ who cooked and cleaned for their white masters 
were pushed out of work when the government decided to start importing higher paid British 
women into the domestic role, hoping to force the Zulu domestic workers underground 
during the mining labour crisis of 1902 (Ibid: 39). Thereafter the advent of household 
electronics such as electric heaters and water heating systems made the Zulu domestic 
workers seem increasingly more expendable to their masters (Ibid.: 229). These labourers 
who had lost their land and cattle in their traditional homelands,and who had become 
dependent on the urban economy (Ibid.: 275), came to increasingly ban together in outlaw 
groups, committing crimes to supplement their lost livelihoods. They began forming gangs; 
for example, the former domestic workers creating what were called the Amalaita gangs 
(Onselen, 1982: 38). These people were regularly rounded up and thrown into prisons which 
                                                            
9Recognising the significant sway disenfranchised white people wielded over the pursuits of capitalists, 
affiliates of the Independent Labour Party said in 1908 that “charity is a safety valve for capitalism” (Onselen, 











will be shown to have further criminally transformed them. One marginalised ‘houseboy’ 
went onto attain god like status amongst the underclass, laying the foundation for the mass, 
organised gangsterism which still dominates South Africa today. He was born to the name 
Mzuzephi Mathebula, renaming himself Jan Note when pushed into a life of banditry and 
finally assuming the name Nongoloza: a reference to the fierce stare in his eyes towards 
prison wardens when he was forging his infamous identity in South Africa’s brutal prison 
system10.
Charles Van Onselen writes of Nongoloza’s life, explaining the development of gangsterism 
in South Africa in his 1984 work titled The Small Matter of a Horse: The Life of 'Nogoloza' 
Mathebula, 1867-1948. Observing how Nongoloza’s life unfolded is telling of the conditions 
of the time. Born into a rural family in 1867, he and his kin had a transition into an urban 
lifestyle avoided by few around the Rand11. In 1948 he died of tuberculosis. His body was 
worn from years of living in and out of the mines and prisons, exposure to countless lashes, 
and dozens of years of hard labour. It also did not help that he lived meagrely and consumed 
more smoke and liquor than most. He died so lonely that after his death his body was never 
claimed.However, today his legend is kept in the hearts and minds ofmany South Africans
living in the most volatile of circumstances, informed by an ever more glaring prison and 
gang experience through kinship ties and personal experiences. 
Working as a migrant labourer and still a teenager in 1886, Mzuzephi was retained by a 
wealthy colonialist who wrongfully blamed him for the disappearance of one of his horses. 
When Mzuzephi refused to promise his free labour for two years in payment for the horse he 
did not lose, and in fear of being sent to the gaol as ordered by his employer, he changed his 
name to Jan Note and ran away from his job as well as the false criminal label he was 
assigned. Hobsbawm notes that outlaws are often made of people falsely accused of 
criminality and this was the case with Mzuzuphi and many of his poor countrymen
(Hobsbawm, 1959: 15). In 1888, at the age of 21,he moved away from his family and began 
                                                            
10 His name is also interpreted to mean ‘the rule giver’ given the disciplined cult-like structure he formulated 
(Lewis, 2006: 39)
11Of such people Hobsbawm might have said: “They were geared to an earlier way of life; it was their tragedy 
that a new world, which they did not properly understand, whirled them into a future with which they 











working as a “stable boy” in Turffontein (Onselon, 1984: 5). Uponbeing hired by the 
Europeans, Van Onselen further explains Jan’s descent into criminality:
“Two of his employers, Tyson and McDonald, gave the black servant some rather 
curious instructions and in return offered to remunerate him comparatively 
generously. He was not to allow any of his black friends near the house, he was to 
attend to the horses most carefully and just in case the groom failed to understand 
the message they showed him a revolver and threatened to shoot him should he 
disobey” (Onselen, 1982: 371)
The aggressive nature of his new employers, he soon learned, was to be expected given the 
fact that they were flourishing highway robbers. Jan had stumbled upon the ‘white 
underworld’; a reality which was fostered by the Rand’s economic upheaval that turned many 
to crime (Ibid.: 371). Onselen includes an appropriate quote from a newspaper dating back to 
1895 which printed “In South Africa it is invariably a case of feast or famine, boom or 
bankruptcy. The happy medium is seldom hit.” (Ibid.: 371)“Famine”, especially in urbanised 
settings, can have the effect of pushing groups to create n w and perhaps illegal ways of 
supporting themselves and depending on the circumstances and the setting, their self-help
may manifest violence.  
Given his discipline and trustworthiness, Jan’s employers began to take him out on their 
heists, involving him in their criminal acts, and teaching him the tricks of the trade. Here, Jan
learned how to rob and steal and after sometime came to the conclusion that he did not need 
to work beneath his white employers and receive a minimal cut of the profits. Given the 
severe inequality around him, he recognised that he could form his own band of thieves and 
reap much greater benefits. He went on to transform a small group of unemployed migrant 
labourers in the outskirts of town who had turned to predatory banditry12, forging them into a 
fully-fledged criminal organisation. Theyused violence and spared no one in their quest for 
power and profits. They called themselves ‘Izigebungu’ and under Note’s leadership they 
were transformed into the ‘Regiment of the Hills’. Note gave the group a patriarchal, 
religious, military framework, greatly influenced by the militant, masculine urban setting. He 
                                                            
12This group at times could have been classified as a group of‘social bandits’ in that they stole from the unjust, 
rich white master for the benefit of the poor. Social banditry is an idea highly developed by Eric Hobsbawm; he 
writes “Robin-Hoodism is most likely to become a major phenomenon when their traditional equilibrium is 
upset; during and after periods of abnormal hardship, such as famines and wars, or at the moments when the 
jaws of the dynamic modern world sieve the static communities in order to destroy and transform them’” 
(Hobsbawm, 1959: 24). However, this bandit group cannot be termed as social in that they also stole from 











also pushed women out of the organisation. Finally, The Regiment was transformed in to 
“The People of the Stone” or “Ninevites”13 (Lewis, 2006: 47). This followedthe growth of the 
mining-prison industry whichsaw people of colour in and around the Rand, like Jan, eitherbe 
confined to hard labour in the mining areas due to restrictive laws, or hard labour in prison 
for breaking the rigid regulations.The prison institutions were a revolving door during 
Nogoloza’s years. So entrenched was the capitalist system that pass laws were formulated 
around it in order to create a setting where people had practically no choice but to work in the 
mines, or go to prison for several years of unpaid hard labour – often in the mines. At any 
rate, a reserve of desperate workers would always remain on hand and those who refused to 
work for the capitalist structure were forced to work by means of the brutal, dehumanising 
prison system. Onselen writes:
“Where the criminal sanctions of the Masters and Servants' legislation failed to 
restrict the employee to the mining industry, the buttressing pass laws ensured that 
the absconding labourer would almost certainly be confined to another largely 
male institution — the urban prison - thus contributing to the development of an 
emerging working class culture richly informed by prison experience” (Onselen, 
1982: 3)
In 1905, Cinderella Prison became the first prison producing labour for the mines (Ibid.: 
377). Policing and prison operations supported South Africa’s leadingindustry, while doing 
so was beginningto inform the culture of the urban poor. Records from 1910 show that “The 
Union spends 2,145,000 Pounds on the administration of justice every ten months, and of this 
1,583,000 is spent on police and prisons.” (Pratt, 1913: 172). This, of course, was a 
                                                            
13 As mentioned earlier, European influence played a significant role in the development of South African 
criminality. Another glaring example of this is that Nongoloza based the structure of South Africa’s prison 
gangs on what he had learned from the Boers and British governments. Charles Van Onselen explained in an 
interview that this showed great admiration by him towards the Europeans strategy for domination (Onselen, 
2012). Though his original followers were all black and felt ostracized by their white masters, Nogoloza 
explained that the very structure of his organization was to come from those who he regarded as the 
oppressors: 
“The system I introduced was as follows: I myself was the Inkoos Nkulu or king. Then I had 
an Induna Inkulu styled Lord and corresponding to the Governor-General. Then I had another 
Lord who was looked upon as the father of us all and styled Nonsala. Then I had my 
government who were known by numbers, number one to four. I also had my fighting general 
on the model of the Boer vecht generaal. The administration of justice was confided to a judge 
for serious cases and a landdrost for petty cases. The medical side was entrusted to a chief 
doctor or Inyanga. Further I had colonels, captains, sergeant-majors and sergeants in charge of 











fraction14of the capital being derived from the mines which depended on a steady flow of 
labour made possible by the pass laws, inequitable labour laws and guaranteed labour coming 
from prisoners who broke the laws designed to keep the poor dependent and 
underground.The more men were deprived of their freedom, the more recruits prison gangs 
were able to indoctrinate.
One reason that is worthwhile in understanding how South Africa’s original criminal 
organisations took form is that it allows researchers to draw parallels between the conditions 
and policies which drew people towards a criminal way of life historically and those which 
draw them in contemporarily. At the root of it, Nongoloza found himself in a life of banditry 
after being treated unfairly by the unequal society he had to live in and with this came great 
punishment.  Part of the punishment was working for the same unequal society he refused to 
stand for in the form of hard labour. The lashes he received upon resistance strengthened his 
resolve and over time he learned not only how to control those around him, but how to lead 
them in resisting authority while pursuing a livelihood at a time when many poor black 
people were not afforded one. Many of his contemporaries, similarly accused, imprisoned, 
beaten, over-worked, or pushed out of work, respected and empathised with Nongoloza’s 
belief in defying the dominant structure. Due to the appalling inequalities which existed 
between the commanding colonisers and masses of landless, often hungry Africans, 
criminality became a more natural response to despair. 
Nongoloza organised around him those who detested the conditions they were forced into; 
they may have been servants, labourers, miners, or structurally unemployed as were the Zulu 
‘AmaWasha’. Nongoloza’s followers understood the great inequality which existed between 
themselves, their employers, landlords and government. As such, the criminal organisations 
which flourished in the late 19th and early 20th century did so by demonizing the dominant 
forces that brutalised them, and finding strength in their collective punishment. As Jonny 
Steinberg states in Nongoloza's Children: Western Cape prison gangs during and after 
apartheid, a major reason prison gangs continue to thrive today is because they embody 
“collective adaptation to mortification” (Steinberg, 2004: 12). Hardened by their conditions, 
the prisoner labourers found justice in their anti-social behaviour, as many gangsters still do 
today.
                                                            











Thus the history of organised crime is over a century old in South Africa. During the years of 
Kruger’s government, when he warred with the resource hungry British empire, a disastrous 
scramble to deport prisoners back to their homelands resulted in the sneaky, smooth escape of 
many gangsters to other modernising South African cities. They pursued their crimes where 
ever they went, taking with them their incarcerated knowledge and gang organisation, 
subsequently creatingnew, violent criminal networks where there was money and prisons 
(Onselen, 1982: 376). As early as 1919, the prison gang Nongoloza had cultivatedwas 
blossoming as far west as the Cape’s Noordhoek Prison15 (Ibid.: 394). 
Sternmeasures were taken by the government circa 1920 in order to suppress the prison 
gangs, and while the government was largely successful in insuring gang activities ceased in 
the public realm, they did not halt the growth of prison gangs themselves (Abrahams, 2010:
501). Rival gangs began to form. An intensifying gang culture was being fostered in the 
prisons which manifested in the formation of competing gangs such as the Mpondo-centered 
Isitshozi, helping spread the South Africa gang phenomena across the country at an even 
greater pace (Ibid.:  501). Organised crime in South Africa was fostered by the inequitable 
labour practices which ushered in the settings necessary to create prisons gangs as well as 
prohibitory policies. These policies created illicit markets, attracting ruthless criminals to 
profit from them, flourishing due to police partnership. Both types of criminality bred 
violence, and the decades that followed played host to the intensification of criminal 
transgressions. 
3.2 Forced removals, additional black markets and the proliferation of drugs
Now that the formation of organised criminality in South Africa has been examined, attention 
canbe focused on criminal developments in Cape Town. Cape Town’s underclass, like that of 
Johannesburg, was a group which struggled disproportionately. David Abrahams writes “As a 
result of urban migration and unemployment amongst youths during the 1940s, the notorious 
                                                            
15Gangsterism continues to rule prisons, and it is paradoxical that the June 2010 edition of SA CorrectionsToday
magazine mentions the word ‘gang’ only once in their entire publication. Even then, it quotes Minister of 
Correctional Services, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, on Freedom Day, April 30th, 2010 in KwaZulu-Natal (where 
Nongoloza was born well over a century earlier), proclaiming: “No human being was born, as a rule of nature, 
to lead a criminal life, to be a gangster and to have no inkling of compassion for the other human beings,” 











suburb of District Six became the birthplace of street gangs16” (Abrahams, 2010: 502) This, 
combined with the release of prisoners in to the community who were informed by the
entrenched gang experience discussed in the previous section, effected Cape Town’s criminal
developments in fundamental ways. The most damage, however, was done a few decades 
later. The 1970s saw the implementation of policies which greatly unsettled the urban poor 
and created social disorder in Cape Town’s most volatile communities. The forced removals 
from District Six, a process which scattered families and friends far from their homes, into 
new, alienating environments, had an ever damaging affect. Racist legislation for the removal 
of inhabitants was passed in 1966, with removals commencing in 1968 and intensifying 
during the 1970s (Abrahams, 2010: 502). Andre Standing, in his 2006 study titled Organized 
Crime: a Study of the Cape Flats, notes that in little over 20 years 50,000 families had been 
displaced from their close knit community in the centre of Cape Town to various areas far 
away in the sandy and historically uninhabitable17 Cape Flats (Standing, 2006: 5). Standing 
builds on the theorisation of Don Pinnock and writes: 
“According to Pinnock, in inner-city areas of Cape Town prior to apartheid, such 
as District Six, youth crime was largely kept in check by parents, neighbours and 
extended family networks. In other words, there was a strong degree of informal 
social control. Forced removals meant the inhabitants of the city were dispersed 
over the Cape Flats and many extended family networks were broken. Life on the 
Cape Flats became far more impersonal and distrustful – it lacked the “cement 
which held the working class culture together”. There was a breakdown in the 
stability of family, shown in high divorce rates, a sharp increase in single mothers 
and a growing tension between children and their fathers, brought about because 
of the men’s sense of inadequacy in their new environment. It was in this 
situation that large numbers of unsupervised youths formed street gangs, 
primarily as a coping mechanism but also as an act of defiance.” (Ibid.: 12) 
Social discord increased and the likes ofhigher divorcee rates, unemployment and single 
parenting became more normal than exceptional (Ibid.: 13). It is moot to say that the 
                                                            
16Abrahams goes to say that “Its inhabitants responded fiercely with vigilante tactics; the ‘mafias’, as they 
became known, were in fact family-based groups who fought for the protection of their close friends and 
family against the ever-growing threat of gangsterism” demonstrating that the type of gangsterism was 
distinctly different from what was to follow a few decades later after the creation of new illicit markets that 
intensified the working relationship between police and gangsters. 
17Extremely powerful winds created obstacles for those trying to travel across it before the advent of 
motorcars. In the mid 19th century alien vegetation was introduced by colonialists in a successful bid to break 
the power of the wind. The Cape Flats saw its biggest surge in population following the Group Areas Act of 
1950 which over the next thirty-odd years saw the relocation of countless families to the area, many of them 
from the inner most core of Cape Town. Today, as shack-lands expand daily and the poor getting pushed 











architects of these communities did not have social cohesion in mind and the scarce public 
spaces for healthy social activity, such as theatres, were soon shut down by the government 
as well (Spocter, 2005: 15). Juvenile delinquency, criminality and gangsterism seemed to 
follow naturally as is the trend in such downtrodden, inorganic poor communities 
internationally. This can be exemplified internationally by the research of Edmund Vaz on 
the development of youth gangs of France in 1962 following the construction of similar bleak
living spaces:
“You have heard of our large building sites . . . the H.L.M.'s18. Here there is a lot 
of trouble with gangs. These families have very many children and they form into 
gangs. We were short sighted in the construction of these buildings, we removed 
these people from their surroundings and housed them in places without a social 
setting.” (Vaz, 1962: 24)
With Vaz going on to add that: 
“...the appearance of anti-social, often violence-prone adolescent gangs tends to 
emerge under (a) traditional slum conditions, and (b) deteriorating conditions 
(new slums) of newly developed, low-rent housing blocks”  (Ibid.: 24)
It becomes easier to understand the social discord and volatility which exists in the Cape 
Flats when reflecting on the formation of such living spaces, understanding the kinds of 
communities they tend to produce. While newly found insecurities were to foster the 
development of gangs in apartheid’s dumping grounds, the formation of these gangs was 
soon to be complimented by seasoned prison gangs which had, until the 1970s, operated 
almost exclusively within the incarcerated realm (Lewis, 2006: 48). As will be demonstrated 
shortly, government policies of prohibition would once again create lucrative opportunities,
bringing their ruthless prison practices to the streets of Cape Town’s worst-off neighborhoods
by forging relationships with the police in profiting from newly illicit markets.  Vaz points 
out that the lack of criminal groups and narcotics lessened the formation of youth gangs in 
France, pointing out that where there are existing criminal groupings the chances of gang 
formation are much higher (Ibid.: 26). Cape Town, in this regard, was well suited for the 
growth of gangsterism.Imprisonment rates amongst the majority coloured community in 
Cape Town, which bore the brunt of forced removals, were extremely high.  Standing writes 
“The rate of imprisonment for Coloured people in South Africa, most of whom 
were living in the Western Cape, was more than double that of Africans: in 1980, 
                                                            











for every 100,000 of each racial group, 729 coloureds were in prison compared 
with 362 Africans, 81 whites and 57 Asians.” (Standing, 2006: 15) 
By the 1970s prison gangs had established a well established following throughout South 
Africa’s prisons, and while dialects and nuances varied from one area racially dominated area 
to another, the ethos of the prison gangs had been well developed, setting the stage for the 
state of contemporary gangsterism, characterised in one way by the blurring of lines between 
prison and street gang, a development which will be discussed at length in the proceeding 
section on contemporary gangsterism. Before the late 1970s, the ranks and identity of gang 
members were restricted to life within prison. In the ‘outside world’, the order of the Number 
insisted that theyleave their gang identities in prison (Vearey, 2011). Prison gangsters from 
that era would attest to this as fact. Prison gangster in such communities may have been 
regarded as strongmen who held sway over community disputes brought to them, but 
organised criminal activity amongst them in the public realm was a rarity. The creation of 
black markets based around illicit commodities, however, enabled the expansion of their 
realm of influence and empowered them in unprecedented ways, fundamentally transforming 
gangsterism and violence in poor communities. 
“The breed of the late 1980s and 1990s gangster is completely different.” said Major General 
Jeremy, who carries out his duties out of Mitchell’s Plain Police station, South Africa’s 
biggest police station (police stations per capita ratio) (Vearey, 2011).This was a result of the 
relationship forged between gangsters and police, rooted in money derived from illicit 
markets created in the 1970s. Introduction of new illicit commodities can have the effect of 
empowering criminal groups which profit from their sale with the help of police protectors.
This trend can be observed locally and abroad. In Brazil19, for example, the introduction of 
cocaine metamorphised the prison gangs andstrengthened their might on the streets of Rio
while setting fertile ground for police corruption by criminalcollusion (Penglase, 2005: 4).As 
it will be demonstrated, the prohibition policy concerning alcohol and Mandrax in Cape 
Townhelped gangsterism flourish on the Cape Flats and also assisted in establishing a 
relationship between police and criminals. Newly found competitive markets contributed
                                                            
19Mark Shaw also draws on this parallel when he writes “The threat of drug operations to South Africa can be 
contextualised by examining Brazil, a country with a similar socio-economic profile. Brazil "is playing an 
increasingly important role asa transshipment state, and has developed an extensive drug consumption 
problem of its own inthe [slums] of Rio de Janeiro". This has led to increased levels of violence in the 











todrastically increasing the quality and quantity of violence on the Cape Flats as competing 
groups came to battle publicly for significant profits, positioning residents of embattled 
communities in the crossfire.One of the most damaging substances – if not the most 
damaging given its sheer reach and scale of consumption – has always been alcohol, which 
was sold in limited quantity to Cape Town’s coloured population in the 1940s and 1950s, 
with sales becoming severely restricted in the 1970s. Andre Standing writes that this shift 
created black market trading, resulting in the spread of violence (Standing, 2006: 9). The 
volatile industry of illegal liquor sales, known as “shebeening”, was the backlash of 
restrictivegovernment policy.  
Though alcohol was not outright banned in coloured communities, the apartheid regime half-
heartedly attempted to curb its consumption by only allowing for twenty government outlets 
to serve the entirety of the Cape Flats (Ibid.: 9). Consequently, the illegal smuggling houses, 
or ‘shebeens’, were born and by the mid 1980s they numbered in the several thousands in the 
Cape Flats alone (Ibid.: 9). These illicit outlets were made operational by police officers who 
protected them and profited with their owners (Grobler, 2009: 375). The rate of consumption 
was significant. In the 1970s, 75% of low-quality wine was consumed inthe Cape Flats20
(Steinberg, 2004: 117). Here, the roads between violence, profiteering and monopolisation of 
substances begin to collide again. Andre Standing explains:
“As is the tendency of criminalised industries, the shebeen industry became 
characterised by violent and morally reprehensible business methods. In 
particular, the inability to turn to legitimate authorities to sort out disputes meant 
shebeen owners required the ability to act violently in order to provide protection 
against their rivals or to help withstand demands for protection money from local 
gangs.” (Standing, 2006: 10)
The gangs, once again, were provided with circumstances to proliferate and enhance their 
relationship with the policing institution. 
There were other illicit commodities which had a similar effect in creating other violently 
protected markets. Mandrax is a depressant and product of methaqualon. Similar to the 
problems caused by the restrictions put on alcohol, Standing identifies parallel effects in the 
criminalisation of Mandrax in 1977 as a boost to violent Cape Town criminality. The black 
                                                            
20It is worth noting that the illegal points of sale continue to thrive today, with the sale of cheap wine to 











market for this drug created massive financial opportunities for gangs, consolidating the 
power of Cape Town’s criminal industry, giving more might to groups who violently 
scrambled to control access to such substances. As expected, prohibition failed to curb high 
demands once again; instead, it increased the profits derived from the market:
“By the mid 1980s illicit demand, almost exclusively among working-class 
Coloureds, had skyrocketed and illegal supplies of Mandrax were provided by 
smugglers from Asia (where it was still produced legally), as well as from 
clandestine laboratories in Southern Africa. As a consequence of prohibition the 
price of Mandrax pills quickly rose to high levels and has now evened out at 
around R45/50 per pill. The profits from selling Mandrax are therefore substantial 
and alongside alcohol and dagga (marijuana), the trade in this drug swiftly became 
one of the most lucrative illegal industries on the Cape Flats.”(Ibid.: 10)
Such developments went onto secure new footing for gangs in Cape Town and as their profits 
grew, so did their increasing need to violently put down competing forces in order to expand 
their markets. At the same time, the more lucrative the illegal industry became, the more 
attention that was brought onto it by the state, meaning more police needed to be on the 
payroll to insure their markets remained as stable as possible. Following the collapse of 
apartheid, it was revealed that the government was actively contributing to the state of 
insecurity in poor communities by proliferating drug addiction and the flooding illicit 
markets. Granted that much will remain a secret regarding their operations, and though
motives will never be revealed unless perpetrators take the unlikely step to volunteer 
information, it is by now clear that government actors were aiding drug gangs into the final 
years of transition and flooding the streets with products they ordained illegal. While the 
intention behind such a tactic can only be speculated upon, a 2002 report by the United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research revealed that clandestine government programs 
produced mass amounts of narcotics. Under the auspice of Wouter Basson, head of South 
Africa’s secret chemical and biological warfare program, a recorded ton of methaqualone was 
manufactured at a front laboratory called Delta G (Folb, 2002: 64). Though it has been 
confirmed that human subjects were tested on, no one has testified as to which group the 
government program used to this end (Ibid.: 84). It would be reasonable to assume that the 
operation was conducted on a mass scale since the records which do exist show that between 
1983 and 1992 R418.2 million were allocated to this operation (Ibid.: 113). The report goes 











“Delta G Scientist, Geoff Candy, told the authors that in about 1985 Basson noted 
that methaqualone and cannabis (in combination) were the street drug of choice 
amongst youth, particularly in the Western Cape. This led to work on the 
combination of the two drugs. Whether the intention was to undermine the health 
of communities or to develop a drug to sell for personal gain is not clear... 1,000 
kilograms of methaqualone was produced at Delta G Scientific under the code 
name Mosrefcat” (Ibid.: 124)
The program was monitored by the Commissioner of Police and Minister of Law and Order
and in 1992 records show the purchase of a further 500 kilograms of methaqualone in mid 
1992, months after the government supposedly ordered a halt to the program (Ibid.: 125). 
Testimony during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission show that in the same year 
Basson offered 100,000 Mandrax to one of his chemist for personal sale (Ibid.: 127). In 1997 
Basson was arrested for dealing a in large quantity drugs, including Mandrax (Ibid.: 216). In 
1999 he was indicted for dealing Mandrax and possession of 500 kilograms of methaqualone 
(Ibid.: 231). The report goes on to shed some light behind the possible reasons for this 
program when it quotes J.P De Villiers, one of the architects of the clandestine operation, 
when he said in 1982 that:
“This success consisted of the inflicting of over ten percent casualties on the 
Americans in Vietnam by the distribution of drugs to their forces. If this is 
considered a chemical warfare action [which it is not], it was undoubtedly 
covertly supported and managed by the Vietcong and their patrons, it is the most 
successful example of chemical warfare in history and one that should be taken 
most seriously, far more seriously than the threat of conventional chemical 
warfare attack”  (Ibid.: 127)
The report concludes that it is possible that “the tablets were intended to undermine 
communities byintroducing addictive drugs21.” (Ibid.: 127) In regards to these 
government policies, David Abrahams gathers that:
“The political agenda of the National Party government, as well as the actions of the 
South African security forces, is often seen as having fostered the creation of an 
environment conducive to gang activity” (Abrahams, 2010: 498)
                                                            
21Revisiting Charles Tilly’s definition of a criminal racket as a process in which a threat is created in 
order to charge for its reduction, it may be that South African government’s actions transcended the 
classic model of racketeering. Though it is clear that the violent gangsterism fueled by state sanctioned 
trafficking created a problem which the state security apparatus consequently tasked itself to remedy, 
in light of Basson's government ordained actions, there also seems to be a serious element of personal 











It may have also been the case that drugs used as currency with gangs for political ends, 
trading the commodity in exchange for violence. Andre Standing cites testimonies during 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission where Police Chief Abram van Zyl admitted to 
contracting Cape gangs to murder opposition activists (Standing, 2006: 137). A British 
newspaper article from 1997, speaking with the University of Cape Town’s Centre of 
Criminology instructor Wilfried Scharf puts it the following way: 
“Unfortunately, the expansion came just when the criminal justice system - and 
the police in particular - was in transformation and least able to cope. The police 
combating the war on the Flats are hampered by the corruption that riddles their 
ranks. Many officers have long-standing ties with the gangs which were used by 
both sides during the apartheid years. "Favours are still owed and information still 
has to be suppressed," (Braid, 1997)
Indeed, even as late as 2012 reports are still surfacing showing close working relationships
between apartheid era members of the policing institution and criminal entities, such as the 
links between Staal Burger of the infamous Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit and night 
club protection tycoon Igor Russol (Dolley, 2012), reminiscent of criminal relationship 
between police and liquor smugglers of a century ago. A continuum of profiteering 
between criminals and police is ubiquitous in South Africa’s history. 
In the Cape Flats, the creation of unstable, socially deteriorated communities was 
complimented first by the prohibition of certain substancesand thereafter by their illegal 
sale made possible by those in the policing institution tasked with stamping out their 
existence. The pursuit of profits from such illicit commodities remains a violent endeavour, 
with those living in the poor drug markets as the ultimate victims. As hoped for by many 
living in those markets before the 1990s, the transition away from racial rule did not 
diminish the violent illicit markets, nor hamper the relationship between public and private 
criminals which maintain them.  
3.3The years of transition
While the years before the end of apartheid deteriorated many communities by intensifying 
violence and criminality, the power transfer that took place in 1994 accompanied with it a 
host of catalysts conducive to further destabilising the already volatile communities. At this 
historical juncture, crime in South Africa increased.Antoinette Louw argues that statistics 











after 1990 when political opposition was no longer illegal, though this fails to account for 
why crime rates still continue to bestaggeringly high in the country(Louw, 1997: 142). She 
argues that the political violence before 1994 created marginalised groups which had come to 
depend on crime for survival (Ibid.: 150). She also argues that there were many illegal 
weapons in the country and that this trend of ownership increased given the state of insecurity 
which continued to exist after 1994, clearly adding to the bloodshed (Ibid.: 150). Louw
reiterates the rise of violencefrom a historical perspective when she writes:
“One explanation for the high rates of violent crime refer to South Africa's 
political history, suggesting that families have been suffering from 'institutional 
violence' for decades through the disruption of their lives by the mass removals 
and migrant labour policies of apartheid ” (Ibid.: 151)
She believes that organised crime flourishes in places undergoing transition (Ibid.: 155), and
that the opening of South Africa’s border ushered in a wave of international criminals who 
were quick to take advantage of the already desolate conditions within the country. She 
writes:
“The clearest evidence of this in South Africa is the targeting of the country in 
recent years by organised drug traffickers. These syndicates are attracted to the 
country by weakened border controls, lack of legislative control over money 
laundering and mass unemployment which presents scope for recruitment ” 
(Ibid.: 155)
In 1994 the number of crime syndicates operating in the country amounted to under 300 
groups (Masiza, 1996: 5). However, as of 2002, this was upped to over 800 groups. Given the 
secretive nature of these organisations, accurate figures can never be confirmed. Mark 
Shaw’s paper titled West African Criminal Networks in South and Southern Africa explains 
that West African criminal network have “revolutionised” the violent South African drug 
market (Shaw, 2002: 292). In these countries22, such as Nigeria and Liberia, corrupt agents of 
the state such as police and border patrol persons participate in the criminal groups which 
began to operate in South Africa in the early 1990s (Ibid.: 297). Upon arrival in South Africa, 
foreign criminals build relationships with the local police, making their operations possible 
thanks to this working partnership (Ibid.: 301). At the same time, these African outlaws23hire 
                                                            
22“The net result was often that the activities of the state and those of criminal groups became 
indistinguishable” (Shaw, 2002: 297) 
23The rising levels of crime in South Africa cannot be attributed solely to foreigners, though some stand by this 











South African gangsters to carry out their blood work for them, further fueling the existing 
violent gang problem (Ibid.: 310).  Mark Shaw compares South Africa to Brazil, another 
significantly unequal society after transition, and notes that there too the country was plagued 
by “levels of violence in the marginalised areas of the city, higher levels of petty crime, and 
increased corruption” (Shaw, 1996: 54).Shaw believes that the opening of South Africa’s 
boarders allowed for the country to be flooded with illegal weapons from neighbouring 
countries, arming gangs who wanted to increase their power (Ibid.: 54).
Thus the opening up of South Africa’s borders left many doors open for heavy-handed 
opportunists to stake out new claims in South Africa’s drug market. A police interviewee of 
Andre Standing’s reflected in the following way:
“They had a field day. The police weren’t doing their job because of what was 
going on in the country at that time and the gangs took advantage of the situation. 
They acted like they were untouchable.” (Standing, 2006: 39)
Before 1994, South Africa experienced great international isolation, being cut off from 
many markets, international banking, travel and general interaction with the outside 
world. With the end of apartheid and acceptance into the global political arena, all this 
changed drastically. Almost too naturally, transnational crime found a new host. Most 
recently, the effectiveness of these criminal networks have been enhanced by South 
Africa’s modernised business and communication systems. South Africa’s former 
Minister for Safety and Security,Steve Tshwete, was quoted saying:
“…since its return to the global arena, [South Africa] has felt the effects of 
transnational organised crime syndicates attempting to extend their tentacles to 
‘new markets’. Given South Africa’s relatively well-developed infrastructure, 
modern telecommunication systems, technology and business practices, it would 
appear that the scope of organised crime has evolved from generally small-scale 
local operations to international syndicates.” (Goredema, 2001: 3)
Beyond being supplied with new commodities, through this experience some South African 
criminologists came to believe that local criminals underwent a learning curve. Peter Gastrow 
put it the following way:
“greater exposure to and competition from established international criminal 











the increased sophistication of South Africa’s indigenous organised crime 
groups”24 (Gastrow, 1998: 56)
The 1994 transition strengthened gangsterism in Cape Town, helping to create the criminal 
realities which exist today. Hobsbawmnotes in Bandits that “Banditry, we have seen, grows 
and become epidemic in times of social tension and upheaval” (Hobsbawm, 1969: 67). His 
half a century old finding seems to hold true in modern times. A 2002 article by Shaw shows 
that these trends are international. He explains how militarily ruled countries in Latin 
America, as well the former USSR, both ushered in organised crime during their time of 
transition (Shaw, 2002: 1). In the case of South Africa, writes Shaw, “the roots of 
criminality”, which existed before 1994, were strengthened after transition, while also stating 
that the wide availability of fire arms increased the rate of violent crimes (Ibid.: 5). A few 
years earlier, in 1996, Shaw also wrote that during the years of transition, “There was 
extensive evidence of state involvement: senior police officers had been implicated in 
weapons smuggling” (Shaw, 1996: 5), again demonstrating a way police work with private 
criminals, increasing the state of volatility in gang-riddled communities. In South Africa, 
criminal groups became better armed and more organised (Shaw, 2002: 5).As noted earlier it 
seems as ifduring the years before the collapse of apartheid most political players hired gangs 
to violently attack their rivals, resulting in the rise of these criminal groups’ strength 
following 1994 (Standing, 2006: 137), consolidating their prowess in the communities they 
operate in. 
Shaw believes that the social discord experienced during the unstable period of transition 
fostered criminality and gang activity (Shaw, 2002: 8). David Abrahams similarly observed 
that “The lack of police responses to urban violence during this period meant that 
gangsterism, rape andmurder flourished in the townships”(Abrahams, 2010: 504).South 
Africa was an unequal society before 1994 and the end of racial rule gave hope to people who 
believed that the destructive system would be replaced by one which fostered opportunities
for growth. To this end Shaw writes:
“This is not to argue that poverty causes crime, but that increasing inequalities in 
wealth, in a context where the poor (and particular those who are young and poor) 
                                                            
24One example is the evolution of extortion and drug-peddling by a night life security industry brought about in 
the mid 1990s by the likes of Yuri “the Russian” Ulianitski who was quick to form partnerships with local street 











have high expectations that this position will change in the future, serves as a 
potentially important causal factor for criminal activity.” (Shaw, 2002: 9)
The people’s hopes were perhaps misplaced. South African’s may have envisioned that their 
police force would be positively transformed. However, according to Gareth Newman,
following 1994, the government continued to recruit poorly educated individuals into police 
positions (Newman, 2002: 8). Furthermore, the new police service absorbed into its rank 
almost 30,000 people from the homelands police units which were notorious for corruption. It 
is statedbelow that 20,000 of these officers had criminal records (Ibid.: 8). Newman builds on 
the works of Tom Lodge, writing:
“Lodge details how corruption was deeply entrenched and routine at the highest 
levels of the homeland administrations throughout most of their existence. He 
makes the argument that considering that many of these people are in the present 
government, "it would be reasonable to expect the continuation of a certain 
amount of corruption... Furthermore, approximately one third were functionally 
illiterate, 30 000 policemen did not have drivers’ licenses and 20 000 policemen 
possessed criminal records" (Newman, 2002: 8)
Given the police history in South Africa, a negative view by South Africans towards this 
institution is nothing new. Today many Cape Flats residents believe there is an unhealthy 
relationship between police and criminals and this will be discussed in the following 
section. However, it is telling of the extent of disillusionment that even in 1990, children 
living in deprived communities shared this belief. A short book published by National 
Institute for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of Offenders and the Social Justice 
Resource Project quoted a standard 4 learnersaying:
“Gangsterism is a dangerous thing. We must put a stop to this gangsterism. If you 
tell the police they say yes because they are also involved with this thing. I don’t 
know who we can tell to help us. That will be the day I die when someone will put 
a stop to this.” (Nott, 1990: 9)
It seems that just as private criminals were able to penetrate the South African underworld 
during a time of instability, the instability also created an environment where criminals within 
the policing institution were able to take advantage.The partnership between the two 











This section provided a historic background on the development of South African criminality
over the last century while drawing parallelsto some internationally observed characteristics 
pertaining to the intensification of such antisocial developments. It was also explained how 
relationships came to be forged between public and private criminals and the effects the 
creation of illicit commodities had on fostering these violence-enticing relationships. Now 
that these findings have been reviewed, it is possible to focus on the three factors of 
gangsterism, the drug commodity and police inefficiencies in more contemporary times, 
allowing for emphasis to be put on the  state of violence and vulnerabilitypermeating in the 











4. SEAWINDS AT A GLANCE
Seawinds is located less than 3 kilometres away from the beachside suburb of Muizenberg, 
playing host to popular tourist attractions such as world class surf-sites, opulent restaurants
and luxury vacation homes. There are also historical attractions reminiscent of Cape Town’s 
colonial legacy, such as the Rhodes Cottage museum, the vacation home and place of death 
of Cecil Rhodes, one of the most effective imperialists to ever profit from Southern Africa. 
The adjacent suburb of Seawinds, on the other hand, is home to some of Cape Town’s most 
violent squatter areas. Unlike Seawinds as a whole which is dominantly coloured in its 
makeup, black South Africans, Africans from other countries and Asian store owners are 
present in the makeshift community of Overcome. The squatter area remains divided by a 
seemingly even split between coloureds and black migrants from the Eastern side of the 
country, mostly having migrated in hopes of economic opportunity. There have been no 
social surveys conducted in Seawinds and as such, it would be worthwhile to observe a recent 
survey from a nearby community which may be helpful when considering how people feel 
about crime and safety in such environments. 
Mannenberg, located 17 kilometers away from Seawinds, is another Cape Flats community 
locked in a state of perpetual violence25. A 2004 survey of 1100 residents revealed how 
residents regarded their community. Of the residents surveyed, 48% believe the police to be 
corrupt, while 41% believed that police take money from criminals(Legget, 2004: 3). 59% 
felt that the crime in their community was gang related, while 69% believed drugs had a 
causal affect on crime (Ibid.: 6). Violent criminality has become so entrenched in these 
communities that 53% of respondents stated that they believed the country was better 
managed under apartheid. Legget concluded his findings by stating that “This high level of 
public knowledge about drugs is indicative of open drug markets, which can only exist in a 
context of lax enforcement” (Ibid.: 6), going on to add that:
“One clear area for enforcement is the sale of illegal drugs, which is being done 
openly enough for all to see that the law can be disregarded with impunity. Aside 
                                                            
25 Given the steady violence in such communities, residents are aware that danger is always present. However, 
on Christmas day, there is of great sanctuary from crime and violence and people feel more at ease. This was 
the case in Seawinds according to residents. Similarly, during the month of Ramadan, poor Muslim 











from the social consequences of the drugs themselves, this fuels the public belief 
that the police are either incompetent or corrupt.” (Ibid.: 8)
While such data does not exist for Seawinds, the two communities are similar enough to 
warrant considering these findings as indicative of other violently impoverished parts of the 
Cape Flats. The following section will demonstrate many similarities observed in the 
Mannenberg survey, with an emphasis on the relationship between police and gangsters in the 
proliferation of the violent drug market. 
4.1 Demographics and economic indicators 
Seawinds is a poor and unpredictable place that shares a border with the infamous ganglands 
of Lavender Hill, with the busy, slow-traffic, two-lane street of Military Road being the 
symbolic boundary between the two areas. The flow of people from one area to the other is 
constant, as is the flow of violence. Typical of violent townships, Seawinds residents blame 
those from neighbouring communities for the crime.  Regardless of race, only the poorest of 
the poor come to live in such squatter camps, serving as a real indication of the level of 
destitution. According to South African census figures dating back to 200126, there were 114 
black Africans, 9 Asians, 12 white people and 8,378 coloured people living in Seawinds
(Census 2001). More than a quarter of the population was aged between 18 and 34(Ibid.). 
Of the 8,531 Seawinds residents counted in 2001, only 10% had graduated from high school
(Ibid.). Furthermore, only a quarter of the population was employed with 24% of those 
employed working in what the government calls “elementary occupations” (Ibid.) which are 
those requiring the least amount of skill and the most amount of physical labour. These are 
also the lowest paying jobs and workers in this sector are easily and frequently replaced. All 
in all, 66% of those employed earn less than R1,600 per month (Ibid.). There were 1,730 
dwelling structures in the community: most of them not yet paid for (Ibid.). The community 
is visibly over-crowded and people live in small quarters. Small shacks, as is the case in all 
squatter areas on the Cape Flats, can be filled by multiple families, troubling as it was noted 
earlier that internationally overcrowding correlates with increased criminality (Legget, 2002: 
3). The government claims that garbage is removed weekly, but the area is constantly filthy, 
                                                            
26Research for this paper was conducted before the release of the 2011 census figures, and correspondence 
with the Strategic Information office of the City of Cape Town revealed that updated ‘sub-level place’ statistics 











and even in the year of 2011 cows could be found walking about the urban slum. Non-
flushing toilets are also to be emptied weekly, but even when this does happen, by mid week 
the scene and smell would be unbearable to anyone raised outside such dismal conditions.
Nearly immobile motor-vehicles, ill-dressed children andpiles of refuse clog the narrow, 
sandy dirt paths along which are countless shacks, put together by everything ranging from 
tin, crates, wooden pallets, sticks, plastic, cardboard to cement and zinc. These dwellings
spread daily and expand outside the designated boundaries permitted by the city for the 
landless masses. Though government census in such communities serve as poor indicators, 
they may be amongst the best available to researchers trying to understand marginalised 
communities such as Overcome. Census in such communities are riddled with inefficiencies, 
so much so that Trevor Manuel, a member of parliament for another community on the Cape 
Flats, said to fellow members weeks before the commencement of the 2011 census that many 
poor South Africans “shut the doors, let out the dogs and turn out the lights when the 
enumerators approach” (Manuel, 2011).
4.2 Water, nutrition and healthcare in Overcome
According to the 2001 South African census, there were 1,380 dwellings with piped water 
inside, which correlates closely with the number of houses, flats, and other solid structures in 
Seawinds (Census 2001). Seawinds’ shacklands had access to 40 “Piped water on stand; 
distance greater than 200m from dwelling” and 51 sources “less than 200m away.”(Ibid.)
However, water is not readily available to all and single water-points are often shared 
amongst hundreds of shack dwellers living in the dangerous community. This is a reality 
made harsher by the fact that the majority of residents – women, who outnumbered men by 
311 in 2001 – are only able to access taps in daylight hours. Come night time, few people are 
brave enough to face the dark, cold streets, fearing a violent threat may be around the 
corner.Legget observed that people in Mannenberg similarly feared walking in the dark 
(Legget, 2002: 4), while Standing quotes in the Sunday Herald: 
“When night falls over Lavender Hill, the people who live there live in fear. They 
fear to go outside after sunset because of gangs who move about under cover of 
darkness and terrorise people.” (Standing, 2006: 11)
Water may be difficult to access, but like any other modern slum in the age of consumerism, 











purchase of a highlyadvertised can of Coke provides a distraction and a momentary escape in 
the dreary environment27. Lacking a way out of the township, nor things to do within it, petty 
consumerism comforts many who live in a society where some may believe that their 
consumer habits denote their social status. Most cannot afford public transportation to leave 
the violently bleak township, creating what Andre Standing calls a “claustrophobic 
existence”, sometimes leading to interpersonal violence between those stuck within
(Standing, 2006: 120). 
Food production is practically impossible in the area. Seawinds and the Cape Flats as a 
whole, was merely hectares of sand which, combined with the powerful winds in the area, 
made it uninhabitable until the mid 19th century. Due to the poor, sandy soil, food production 
is a distant reality. Lacking access to material and intellectual resources necessary for food 
production, Seawinds’ expanding squatters resemble an overpopulated wasteland with its 
inhabitants usually hungry for food that is never guaranteed. Work, typically strenuous, is 
low-paying, extremely scarce, and usually temporary. Locally food can only be purchased at 
the shack-turned-store-front ‘spaza shops’ which carry a very limited number of goods sold at 
higher prices than distant grocery stores which can offer lower prices due to their bulk 
purchasing power. While the upper classes not too far away exercise their privilege of 
spending hundreds or thousands of rands and buying in mass, squatter customers at the spaza 
shops normally buy their bread loaves in halves and tobacco in the form of single cigarettes. 
Cheaper grocery stores, kilometres away, remain practically inaccessible to the poor who lack 
the meagre funds necessary for transportation into the suburbs where the stores are located, 
and those who are willing to trek the distance typically do not possesses the spending power 
to buy bulk. As such, the poor eat what is near and what they can afford. Only a handful of 
fresh vegetables and fruits are sold at the spaza shops and since these items often cost more 
than processed foods like canned beans or bread, people tend to opt for cheaper, less 
nutritious options. 
The combination of low food quality, limited food quantity, insufficient knowledge 
regardinghealthy nutrition, substandard living conditions in the worst geographical corners of 
Cape Town and the inability to address these difficulties ultimately leaves the population far 
                                                            
27Coke, which is grotesquely expensive relative to the shack-dwellers finances, remains one of the few 
accessible sources of entertainment – a rare connecter between the classes, it is the drink held in the hand of 











more susceptible to illness and disease. Tuberculoses, for example, already dominates the 
township. Statistics from 2008 to 2011 show an active problem with about 300 people in 
Seawinds constantly suffering from the illness, which in the last three years has caused 76 
(recorded) deaths (Seawind Clinic, 2011). It would be reasonable to assume that many live 
and die undiagnosed and untreated. Various religious mobile medical outreaches, comprised
of vans with testing apparatusand survey staff, sporadically visit the area, parking outside 
shipping containers that act as political counsel offices in order to conduct ad-hoc 
examinations of the population. However, an amalgamation of the slum-dwellers’ lack of 
education regarding their health, suspicion towards outsiders and those associated with the 
council, a general lack of faith in the quality of such clerical-health outreaches, as well as a 
morbid fear of discovering a life threatening ailment which they believe they will not have
the ability to treat, keeps many township residents at bay and this perpetuates the health 
crisis. Adequate medical facilities to treat ailments do not exist in Seawinds; one government 
clinic exists for the entire community. At times of emergency the urban poor can try to access 
distant public healthcare institutions; however, wait times are lengthy and quality of service 
often poor. Regardless, many cannot go at all because they lack funds for transportation28. 
Residents discussed the inadequacies of the sole community clinic in Seawinds, mostly in a 
mocking fashion. Some may have physical scars as proof of the low quality of service 
received. One young man was left witha scar on his arm after the clinic had mistakenly
stitched his skin to his muscle when he had gone in for emergency treatment after a stabbing. 
Wait times are long and quality of service substandard, but what seems to upset people most 
is the attitude of the government employees, with some feeling that they are treated carelessly
and that that the clinic workers looked down on them due to their socio-economic status. 
Reference were made about doctors being ‘perdedokters29’, which in the Number
                                                            
28Private clinics, on the other hand, are conveniently located wherever hubs of wealth are present. Speedy and 
reliable ambulance service is often taken for granted by those people living in wealthy neighbouring suburbs 
who can readily access them. These medical businesses own private helicopters and fleets of emergency 
vehicles and their facilities are equipped with the latest medical technology and specialists to operate them. 
Medical services come as swiftly as one can show proof of insurance, swipe a credit card, sign a cheque, or put 
cash on the counter. Few, if any, residents of Overcome have ever possessed such spending power and that 
will not likely change within their lifetime. Most live day to day, or as locals often repeated ‘hand to mouth’, 
utilising coins and small banknotes, which greatly contrast the large banknotes and credit cards the nearby 
privileged community is accustomed to. 
29Here is the term in the context of Jonny Steinberg’s prison research in the Western Cape during the early 











gangsmeans ‘horse doctors’. Such people do not think highly of government health initiatives
or institutional health care workers and their terminology is important to decipher as prison 
education can influence entire generations and communities, a result of the poor population’s 
regular recycling through the scarringprison institutions. The lives of many Overcome 
residents have become intertwined with gangsterism, prison and institutionalisation to the 
point that they interpret life in public as if incarcerated. A common theme between a life of 
incarceration and a life in volatile communities is the ever present threat of violence. 
4.3 Violence 
Overcome falls in the Muizenberg policing district. According the South African Police 
Service’s website, between March 2011 and March 2012 there were 3 culpable homicides 
and 26 murders. There were 78 reported cases of sexual crimes, 35 attempted murders, and 
212 assaults “with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm” (the highest number in the last 8 
years), above and beyond the 309 common assaults (South African Police Service, 2012). 
There were 84 robberies and 210 more with “aggravating circumstances”: a further 1,084 
thefts of an undisclosed nature were also recorded by the SAPS (Ibid.). The number of 
residential properties broken into was 649 while 410 motor vehicles were broken into and 
123 vehicles stoles (Ibid.). There were 32 cases of illegal arms position and 2 kidnappings. 
(Ibid.)  The 4580 criminal offences recorded in Muizenberg policing district in 2012 marks 
the highest number since 2004.
At the time of writing in early 2012 there were three squatter camps in Seawinds, or 
‘informal settlements’ as referred to by state representatives. Since the 2001 census, 
boundaries defining the borders of Seawinds and Lavender Hill have been altered more than 
once. Squatter camps have grown and expanded in population and space, with new, smaller 
ones forming as well. Boundaries continue to be redrawn, placing a squatter community in 
one municipal suburb one year and another suburb the next. For all practical reasons and 
purposes, namely the sheer amount of violence and the low quality of life, these areas are 
referred to by many residents as ‘ghettos’. Such vocabulary is also shared by academics 
ranging from Andre Standing to Don Pinnock and Charles van Onselen, as well as high-
ranking members of the police in the Western Cape, all of whom are familiar with the gang 
reality which dominates everyday life in the urban ghettos (Vearey, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                                                             












While writing in June 2012, there were 9 attempted murders in a 2 week period, with 10 
people killed as a result of drug-market related gang warfare(Dolley, 2012).  By July this 
number was over 20. Residents remain vulnerable. In that same month, the provincial 
government began demands for national military operations to fight the gang warfare, a move 
which seems to be increasingly popular with governments in charge of drug-riddled 
communities30. On July 6th, 2012, 3 hours after the Community Safety MEC Dan Plato
arrived in Seawinds with a heavy security detail to discuss the shootings, another person was 
gunned down. The family members of the victim, too afraid to be named or speak at length in 
fear of reprisals, were quoted saying “Everyone is afraid. It’s almost like we’re living under a 
curfew.”(Maditla, 2012). Her sentiments reflect the reality of living in such volatile, seeming 
lawless communities31. A day earlier Plato had recommended an extra 6 hours of policing in 
the already tense, gang-riddled communities, failing to address the underlying relationship 
between the drug commodity, gangs and the police which compromises the lives of residents 
through the violence produced in illicit markets.
In such communities, insecure, traumatised, and stigmatised youths in awe of prison 
gangsters continue to form collective security agreements that manifest themselves in the 
form of gangs. This reality has been noted by many Cape Town criminologists from different 
decades, such as Pinnock, Standing, and Kinnes, observing other parts of the Cape Flats. 
Youth form gangs amongst themselves in a bid to address their mutual vulnerability in an 
unpredictable environment. The gangs can also serve as a foundation to hatch criminal plans 
for material excess, such asdrugs, liquor, cars, designer clothes and cash: things many youth 
seemed to strive for. Observing the streetwhere most male youths in Seawinds spend their 
time, one quickly notices that “26”, “27”, and “28” visually dominate the public sphere. 
These numbers are typically found spray-painted or created through other forms of vandalism 
and brand most intersections, street corners and traffic signs. At the same time “Corner 
Boys,” “JFK” (Junky Funky Kids), or “Sexy Boys” promote dominant street gangs. 
American and British32 flags flown, worn, or drawn represent similar, equally or more 
                                                            
30See the limpienze, or cleansing, of Cuaca Valley, Colombia.
31 Sometimes this sense of lawlessness leads to residents form vigilante groups, such as the group People 
Against Gangsterism and Drugs, and ultimately taking the law into their own hands.
32The American flag represents the Americans gang, one of the largest in Cape Town. The Union Jack, on the 











powerful street gangs. Flying the flag of a particular street gang, such as the American flag, is 
a bold and aggressivemaneuver which obtains its significance from the imaginary visuals 
portrayed by prison gangs who metaphorically fly their flags within their prison compounds, 
once again showing the influence prison gang culture has had on street gangs. The interplay 
between street gangs and prison gangs is ever changing, but what once was a culture kept 
within prison now dominates countless communities like Overcome. The youth are most
eager to learn whatever they can about gangsterism and disseminate the information they 
come by amongst each other with great fervor.
Other high-traffic areas, though free of graffiti and visual claims, are hawkishly guarded by 
young, armed gangsters protecting small markets. They are sent there by their superiors to 
protect territories and maintain claim to ‘turfs’ by eliminating competitors and selling 
noxious narcotics, such as Mandrax, most recently ‘unga’ (heroin), and, of course, ‘tik’ 
(crystal methamphetamine) which will be discussed at length in the drug section of the thesis. 
These narcotics are sold to anyone who has money and even to those lacking the funds but 
showing promise of susceptibility to dependency or subordination. Through credit, the gangs 
can utilise such individuals in roles such as drug runners and sellers, or assassins. The latter is 
a position preferably reserved for child addicts the gangs actively seek to foster for their 
rosters. These young addicts are often of the utmost value because they are not only hard to 
spot as assassins, but are less likely than adults to be caught or imprisoned. The grim realities 
of this realm of life in Seawinds manifested itself one Saturday morning, on the 12th of 
November, 2011. 
After residing in the community for what seemed like a couple of weeks, the author realised 
that the man he spoke to at the protest and who he subsequently moved in with, was a high 
ranking member of a prison gang. For the interest of protecting those who knew him, the man 
will be referred to as Calvin. He was affiliated with different street gangs throughout his 50 
years, graduating from one centre of criminal power to another. He once explained how he 
had spent most of his life in prison. Out of the twenty-odd positions he listed one night in his 
shack bedroom, Calvin was about three ‘notches’ away from being the top man in his 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
example, to be ‘going British’, as street gangsters would say, means to be carrying guns. This dates back to 
South African gang folklore formed from the colonial period around the year 1900, demonstrating yet again 
the power of prison education on people on the Cape Flats. Prisoners use the term geBritish, meaning ‘an 











particular Number. In early 2011 hewas assassinated. The room where he waskilledwas a 
place where countless people, from toddlers to elders, addicts to police and preachers, would 
always come and go. Some came to sell stolen goods, many to buy marijuana, but most 
dropped by to socialise. One night, in the typical presence of the many people from the 
community who would gather in the room, young assassins of Overcome’s leading tik gang 
stormed in. They emptied a few rounds into the ground to disperse the crowd before spraying 
Calvin with five bullets to the body and three to the face. He died instantly, sitting on the old, 
dirty, orange-cushioned, throne-like chair he always sat on. This particular chair was the only 
soft chair in the shack and thus reserved for the patriarch who provided for so many people in 
the community, while intimidating even more33. The chair, which remains in the high-traffic 
smoke-room, is a stark reminder of how quickly things can change in communities 
riddledwith drugs and gangsterism, and representative of the ever present threat of 
unpredictable violence. 
Calvin’s memorial was held seven months after his death at a neighbouring squatter area by 
the name of Hill View Projects 2. This squatter area falls in and out of Seawinds, with 2001 
maps drawing it in and 2008 maps placing it within Lavender Hill. In reality, however, the 
communities are one in the same. The memorial was held inside a metal tin-shack hall that is 
a popular social gathering spot for many from Overcome, as it is the only large gathering area 
to dance.  It is a very large shack, perhaps as big as ten average-sized shacks put together. On 
Friday nights, wonderful, upbeat music blares from the massive speakers within the metal 
hall. Inside is a dance floor packed with the young and old, dancing until the early hours of 
the morning while smoking broken glass bottle-necks crammed with cheap, seedy marijuana 
and tobacco, in a liquor-free environment. The dead man’s 50th birthday was also held there 
months earlier. On the morning of the memorial, a loud cracking noise was heard in the hall 
as if the tin roof was collapsing. Looking up, it was clear nothing had moved. Outside, 
however, laida deadman who was on his way to the memorial.
                                                            
33Hobsbawm may have been describing men like Calvin when he wrote:
“They are heroes not in spite of the fear and terror they inspire, but in some ways because of 
them. They are not so much men who right wrongs, but avengers, and exerters of powers; their 
appeal is not that of the agents of justice, but men who prove that even the poor and weak can 











About 30 meters away from the hall a small crowd began gathering around him. People knew 
his name and reputation. He was on his way to pay homage to his old friend and colleague, 
Calvin. That night people spoke about the assassinations he carried out as a member of one of 
Cape Town’s gangs from the 1980s. He was one of the most notorious members of his gang, 
having acquired a long list of enemies due to the number of people he had killed. He often 
dressed up in different disguises, sometimes as a labourer, other timeselaborately as a 
woman, in order to tactfully carry out his craft. That morning, he took one bullet to the top of 
his head and another through his neck. The teenage tik addict who shot him was on a bicycle: 
belonging to a gang,whose dominance is unmatched in the area, growing in influence, 
territory, and strength as it carelessly battles with other established gangs for territorial drug 
supremacy on the Cape Flats. Following the shooting, no one seemed distraught or surprised; 
it was just another Saturday morning and just another killing. Such shootings seem normal 
for the residents, with some elders adamantly believing that things in the community will 
only worsen. Many of these elders, who have seen the changing nature of gangs, claim that 
the youth in these communities are doomed; this was the dominant message from the elders 
present at the memorial that night who are witness to the rise in drugs and partnerships 












The public domain in Overcome is bullishly dominated by men and the little privacy that 
shacks provide to a private life is also controlled by the patriarch. Residents, as well as those 
familiar with the socio-economic conditions of the townships, know all too well that the types 
of conflict and the quality of violence are wide-ranging. Many youths living in the
community, like their counterparts in other urban communities, admire power, material 
wealth and social status. In the communities like Overcome, no one is more admired and 
feared than the gangster, as they tend to have the greatest access to the material goods money 
can buy, such as designer shoes, cellular phones, cars, substances, as well as protection, and 
power. They also tend be in company of many women.For some, fear seems to be as desired 
as respect, with some easily impressionable youths believing that the two are interchangeable
as they grow up with gangsters whose dominion is based on being feared through the violent 
acts they perform (Standing, 2006: 192). Many young people want to be like the gangsters-
come-drug-dealers and sometimes, even before learning to walk, they learn to throw up gang 
signs with their fingers. Such behaviour is a source of laughter for families who are the oral 
historians of a gang-riddled history. 
Overcome’s past is spotted with gang migration, housing many gangsters who have found 
refugethere over the last decade in their bid to avoid reprisals for what they may have done 
elsewhere. Calvin, for example, was one of the founding squatters in the area afterfleeing 
Hanover Park. He moved because he feared for his life. Indeed, such fear-based migration is 
common for those who dread being hunted34. However, what is most troubling about 
Seawind’s gang reality is the constant proliferation of violent criminality. Thisis manifested 
by constant gang creations by traumatised, misled youthand the recruitment of new, young 
gangsters by established, father-figure like gangsters35 whose drug operations are made 
possible due to police partnerships.
                                                            
34This is true of both the young and old entrenched in gangsterism. A young man of 13 who was spoken to in 
early 2011 explained how he had moved to Overcome and changed his appearance in order to avoid 
retaliation from family and friends of those he killed as a child assassin years earlier. 
35 Because many of those who turn to gangsterism lack parents or healthy family structures, powerful 











It was mentioned earlier that South Africa was the first country in Africa to undergo an 
industrial revolutionand the rush for profits had manyconsequences, inequality between 
the rich and poor arguably being the most harmful one of them all. It was also explained
that gangs were formed by those who were economically disenfranchised.  Today, with 
extreme inequality still present as one of South Africa’s most definitive feature, many 
people in Overcome, lacking opportunities for personal growth, turn to gangsterism. For 
such people, gangsterism is tantamount to initiation into manhood36. Young men gain a 
place of respect in the community through intimidation and the instilment of fear. At the 
same time, so ingrained is gangsterism for some living in the squatter camp that they 
feel they were born into the life, often due to intergenerational, family-wide 
participation in the gangster way of life. Having met those whose mother’s and father’s 
families were both gangsters, familiar with Nongoloza’s condition as they also lived 
under gravely unequal circumstances and wereforced into dehumanising intuitions and 
ways of existence, it is easy to understand how one could fall into the path of 
gangsterism. Such people grow up committing crimes; they and their families tend to 
treat this as a normal part of life. Often one has to live this life of crime in order to 
survive.Others have been made to believe that gangsterism and crime are natural parts 
of their lives that they must embrace in order to ensure their own survival. 
Just as manyprivileged young adults may take for granted that they must go to 
university, many youth in violently impoverished communities foresee joining a gang 
and going to prison.Youths from these communities are often labelled as gangsters 
before ever turning to crime and this labelling has horrendous consequences. Andre 
Standing argues that doing this creates a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Standing, 2006: 
124). This self-fulfilling prophecy is strengthened by an apparent infatuation with 
gangsterism. It is crucial to understand that gangsters in the community – those who 
have demonstrated their readiness and enthusiasm to carry out extreme acts of violence 
– are widely idolised. Young men, who make up the demographic sought out by gangs 
for recruitment, see the gang leaders as beacons of omnipotence in their claustrophobic 
communities. Furthermore, these men are also the only residents of the community with 
weapons and a support system of combatants which is highly appealing in an 
                                                            
36Very few female gangs exist in Overcome, but rarely do they rob, steal, or work with drugs (unless doing so 












unpredictable, threatening, and violent squatter area like Overcome. The gangsters also 
practice dominion over women – something very appealing for young men raised in 
highly patriarchal, sexualised setting where men can shout and grab at women at will. 
Compendiously put, the gangsters are looked up to because they have access to money, 
power and sex; three things many young men are socialisedto yearn for in the bleak 
township.  
Different theorists offer varying explanations as to why gangsterism thrives within townships. 
The most basic of explanations pertains to the lack of opportunities for youth within 
townships; however, this is too superficial of an explanation. To comprehendwhy 
gangsterism thrives within Cape communities one must scrutinise the history of the local 
population. The apartheid state’s treatment of the majority coloured population in Cape Town
varied greatly from the treatment of others. A particularly paternalistic outlook towards the 
group exposed people to the will and design of the white government which used a 
combination of heavyhanded punishments and dependency-creating aid,portraying coloured
men in poor communities as drunks in order to disparage them, and giving family welfare aid 
to female heads of households which seemed to have a belittling effect. Standing writes:
“White paternalism has been used to explain specific policies towards the 
Coloureds under apartheid. So, for example, abhorrence at the level of broken 
families and youth delinquency meant large numbers of social workers were 
dispatched onto the Cape Flats to save women and children from their drunken 
husbands and fathers. The upshot was a tendency to send many young Coloured
boys to reformatories – draconian institutions that attempted, quite literally, to 
whip Coloured boys into shape. In 1980 there were 2,500 Coloured youths so 
incarcerated on any given day” (Standing, 2006: 9)
Prisons and other institutions administering Cape Town’s racial majority were pivotal in the 
degradation of entire communities far before the decade preceding the collapse of racial rule. 
This legacy of institutionalisation continues and its results are equally if not more destructive.
Standing explains:
“From the mid twentieth century, there was a steady increase in the number of 
young Coloured men being sent either to reformatories or to prison. The national 
prison population grew from 23,000 in 1945 to about 51,000 in 1959.Coloured
people were also being exposed to high levels of corporal punishment, including 
caning, and the death penalty: it was estimated that some 18,500 people were 











reformatories. It is moot whether this brutal response to petty crime and lack of 
discipline can be linked to high levels of interpersonal violence in the Coloured
community. Perhaps less contentious is the argument that exposure to prison was, 
and still is, psychologically ruinous and the cause of much more harm than good.”
(Standing, 2006: 15)
The inequitable treatment of the coloured37 population was coupled with other destructive 
policies. As explained earlier, forced removals further disintegrated communities, fostered 
violence and increased the likelihood of young men seeing the need for and value in, gangs. 
Still today many youths feel that in order to safely navigate the chaotic and bleak townships
they must ascribe themselves to equally bleak, chaotic groups such as gangs. This was 
certainly the case in Overcome from 2010 to 2012 as youths grouped themselves in gangs 
averaging three to five people. These teenagers quickly militarised as well with guns and 
while in the 1980s gangsters typically fought with knives, today the youths easily access 
arms. Insecurity can result in increased volatility. Take for example an incident in late 2011 
when a teenager inOvercome was stabbed in the throat after getting into a verbal altercation 
with another group of youngsterswho had demanded R1 from him. To protect themselves 
from encounters such as this one, many youths organise themselves into small gangs. The 
friends of the boy who was killed now carry guns. A few months after forming their grass-
roots security collective, they were breaking into houses and selling tik for the leading gang
in the area.Here the same conditions which foster gangsterism to flourish in prison can be 
recognised in the townships. One condition which nurtures gangsterism is individuals’
inability to escape the unpredictablyaustere conditions which exist in their surroundings
(Steinberg, 2004: 19). Steinberg writes “in the 1990s, the youths of Cape town’s ghettos 
began to imagine their neighbourhoods as prisons”(Ibid.:281).In the case of prisoners, they 
cannot escape the prison, and in the case of youth within the township, they cannot escape the 
brutal township lifewhere the threat of violence seems to always be lurking.   
Major General JeremyVearey, a uniquely knowledgeable person when it comes to policing 
and gangsterism given the fact that he himself used to be a gangster (Joseph, 
2003),believes youths are more likely to turn to gangsterism because “the gang is the 
largest group formation and subculture.Here the consistently strong and sustainable social 
formations are gangs” (Vearey, 2011).So strong is the culture of gangsterism that he 
                                                            
37It must be noted that this was not the reality for all coloured people as there were minority coloured groups 
who were relatively well off, well educated and living in safer, drug and gang free communities. Thus, the 











described how it was accepted practice that when gangsters were killed, like the ones in his 
family, the family would carry out part of the processions and the gangs the other part. “It 
shows you how permeated it is in normal cultural life in the Cape Flats,” going on to add 
that “If you were a youngster growing up... there was very little group activity that you 
could do that would fill in the gap between adolescents and becoming an adult.” (Vearey, 
2011) In the four or five decades before the end of apartheid, gangsterism was far less 
about money than it is now. He also believes thattoday’s gangsterism is much more 
imbedded in the poor communities. The advent of a lucrative drug market caused a 
fundamental shift.
Vearey is one of the people who believes that the intensification of gang criminality around 
drugs formulated from the late 1970s, booming, thanks to criminalisationand again in the 
1990s with the opening of South African borders,creating a crossover between street gangs 
and prison gangs (Vearey, 2011). It is well documented that profits pressed prison gangs,
which traditionally only existed in prison,to sell their influ nce to increasingly powerful 
street gangs.Although the reasons for the inception of gangsterism in Cape Town were 
dreadful, the social phenomena has transformed tremendously since its rise to prominence 
in the second half of the 20th century with the key factor being the proliferation of a 
powerful and lucrative narcotics market made possible by the protection of police. 
While prison gangs used to have the utmost supremacy in Cape Town’s criminal world, 
gangsters and drug dealers now attest to a structural changing of the guard. To be a part of a 
prison Number was a lengthy and rigorous process, in which one could only climb the ranks 
after serving many brutal years in prison, a process which almost always required shedding 
blood. High-ranking street gang bosses now enter prison and easily buy their way into the 
highest ranks of the Number (Lewis, 2006: 11). Once back on the streets, they possess new 
powers and networks as a result of their trip. This is a common strategy used by many 
aspiring street gangsters looking to bolster their criminal credentials. Cash is king and it is 
quickly buying influence within the Numbers who control prisons, as the street gangs have 
come to thrive off money from new drug markets. 
Prison gangsters wanting to cash in on the street gangsters’ financial successes are willing to 
‘sell’ their well-defined names, affiliations and Number to those strong enough to purchase it. 











street gangsters in a way which often obliges them to hierarchically fast-track their ‘outside’ 
counterparts; in this zero-sum game, if they do not do it, their competitors will. Prison gangs 
offer protection to the powerful street gangsters while they remain incarcerated.  Often they 
are only in transit while their well-paid lawyers are getting them out of prison. Indeed, time
spent ‘inside’ is a time of vulnerability for anyone, especially those known for access to 
resources.  For the last three or so decades, the prison gangs have built relationships with 
dominant drug gangs38 whose interests are maintained by bloody warfare over drug markets 
kept alive with the support of their respective police partners. With the stakes rising and the 
end of apartheid creating a vacuum for gangs to proliferate, what used to be inter-gang battles 
fought with knives, axes and pipes has given way increasingly haphazard gunfights (Vearey, 
2011), reflecting the increased presence of illegal weapons which became noticeable during 
the years of transition away from apartheid. 
With narcotic markets continuously expanding, consequentially empowering criminal 
operations, the Cape’s drug market and gang culture proliferates. Gangsters and the people 
living amongst them, as well as the highest ranks of the police (Vearey, 2011), agree that this
trend has led to the destabilisation of the gang-order that existed before the 1980s. In the past, 
only prison gangsters gained criminal respect on the outside. An interview with leading Cape 
Town criminologist, Irvin Kinnes revealed that this corresponds with an era when addictive 
drugs were not yet prominent (Kinnes, 2012). Today however, the competition for market 
shares in the sales of expensive and highly addictive narcotics has made urban poverty far 
more erratic. Gangs are competing for limited markets, steadily decreasing the value of life in 
unison with the maximisation of profits39. Though affiliation between prison gangs and street 
gangs is no new occurrence, profits now come before all else, dissolving the little order that 
the prison gangs used to offer gangsterism and criminality.The institution of South African 
gangsterism has changed over the last century, and the behaviour of gangsters has become 
harder to predict. The ever increasing youth gangs are especially impulsive. A few gangs 
used to control many members, while today gangs can be comprised of as few as three 
people, operating with their own rules and motives. Even gang loyalties are now 
                                                            
38 The most important relationships are between the Americans who are aligned with the 26s and the Firm, the 
other super drug gang, who is aligned with the 28s.
39Interviewing Major General Jeremy Vearey; he spoke of violent, yet predictable blood baths which kept the 
community at large safe during the 1970s. Gangsters used to warn bystanders and clear them out of the area 












questionable, as it is not uncommon for a 26 to kill an American, another 26, or to go against 
the order of the Number, which used to hold dominion over gangsterism. 
Today the gangs are well protected by their police contacts. Police are known to sell 
weapons and drugs to gangsters and even transport illicit materials for them (Grobler, 
2009: 385). If a gang is to be raided, friendlypolice officers warn them (Ibid.: 377). All of 
this is common business practice between gangsters and police internationally as cited by 
the Mollen Commission’s findings regarding corruption in the New York Police 
Department which will be discussed at greater length in the concluding police section. In 
the case of Cape Town, recent research has shown that the relationship between police and 
gangsters is easily struck up because many police officers have grown up with gangsters in 
drug ridden communities (Ibid.: 297) and this may play a part in explaining rampant 
corruption (Ibid.: 366). Some within the police believe that every major criminal group is 
working with the police (Ibid.: 381).It has also been found that where there are drugs, the 
propensity for collusion between cops and gangsters is heightened (Ibid.: 441).The types of
links between gangsters and police will be discussed after observing the role of drugs in the 












By now it is clear that illegal substances have long played a formative role in Cape Town’s 
townships. Prohibited items always create black markets for their sale and as demonstrated
earlier, apartheid’s paternalistic treatment of the population did not diminish the demand for 
government banned substances. Consequently, their illegalisation lead to fierce competition 
between competing forces looking to profit from valuable intoxicants traded at great risk. 
While in the past police commissioned with shutting down illicit markets also got paid by 
criminals to ‘look the other away’, today the relationship between cops and gangsters over 
the sale of drugs is far more complex. This may be due to the drug market’s expansion and 
the introduction of much more lucrative substances. For example, crack-cocaine was first 
found being sold South Africa in 1995 (Legget, 2002: 18). It follows naturally that with 
greater profits, gangsterism proliferates and as it does, the need to protect business interests is
heightened, leading towards more deep-rooted ties with those whoseproclaimed duty is to 
shut down such markets. 
The number of people benefiting from the distribution of banned substances has risen 
dramatically, as has the potency of substances. In the process gangsters as wellas state 
officials, ranking high and low, have come to benefit. Most recently on the higher end, the 
now former wife of South Africa’s intelligence minister, SiyabongaCwele,was convicted of
importing drugs into the country with a Nigerian syndicate.Clearly, the problem is a 
systematic one, affecting everything from near the root – say the spouse of the intelligence 
minister – to the leaves – the cops on ‘the beat’.The drug markets are jealousy protected and 
it seems as if there are no warnings put out to those who impede on existing businesses. In 
the case of Calvin, there were two suspected reasons for why he was shot: one was that he 
over stepped his boundaries by selling a small quantity of tik that he had bought at a very low 
price from a seller who had to liquidate his supply before escaping from the area.
Commenting in reference to the gang warfare plaguing the Cape Flats at the time of writing 
in July 2012, Celia Dawson, deputy CEO of the National Institute for Crime Prevention and 











“Youth, young adults and older males in particular have lost the ability to craft a 
life for themselves. This helplessness and hopelessness have contributed to the 
relentless phenomenon of the gang” (IOL News, 2012)
The same news source states: “Dawson said drugs were the local currency for these 
communities, both as a means of earning a living and as a way to dull the pain of 
hopelessness.” (Ibid.) This state of being is fostered by the relationship between gangsters
and police criminals. Elizabeth Grobler’s PhD dissertation pertains to police criminality in 
the Western Cape, and she explains how the relationships with criminals manifest themselves
in a multitude of ways. For example, one of the most common ways is by drug dealers calling 
their police contacts after a transaction to have the buyers commodities confiscated and sold 
back to the drug dealer at a fraction of the price. Grobler also found that drugs are the 
commodity most often stolen by police (Grobler, 2009: 305). Other practices include, but are 
not limited to, police doing surveillance work for drug gangs and the ‘disappearing’ of 
weapons from police depots for sale to gangsters. Dockets on gangsters go ‘missing’ by the 
hundreds. Furthermore, police will muster up false warrants in order to raid drug dens so they 
can sell back that which they ‘confiscate’ back to their drug dealing associates (Ibid.: 386). 
According to Elizabeth Grobler’s research, it is believed that only 5% of drugsare ever
confiscated(Ibid.: 292). This finding cannot be taken lightly, andin light of all the 
transgressions, it would be reasonable to imagine corrupt police officers as members of the 
drug gang’s criminal rosters.Residents living in drug infested communities tend to feel 
helpless against the power and influence wielded by gangsters. Andre Standing states in 
regards to the Cape Flats that “...there isa strong level of public distrust in the local police, 
who are often accused of beingcorrupt and of having close connections to gang members.” 
(Standing, 2006: 53)Elizabeth Grobler similarly writes that:
“It is largely accepted that police cannot fight crime effectively without the 
support40 of the community in which it occurs. Likewise, police criminality, 
corruption, and misconduct cannot be reduced if there is no positive 
communication and trust between the police and they community they serve.”
(Grobler, 2009: 214)
                                                            
40According to AfroBarometer “In 2008, 46% felt that ‘almost all’ or ‘most’ police officials are involved in 
corruption, compared to a majority of 51% in 2011”. Thus, within the South African context, this ‘support’ from 
the citizens must be diminishing even further as the 2012 AfroBarometer findings show an increase in people’s 











Within communities like Seawinds,andvery rarely at that, there are seldom brave individuals 
who take a stance against the drug dealing gangs. None, however, take lightly the possible 
aftermath. Perhaps because they know what will happen to them, few ever cooperate with 
police or act against the drug dealers in their communities. In October 2011, less than a 
kilometer from Overcome in neighbouring Lavender Hill, a 61 year old woman named Joan 
Everson, known for her anti-gang stance and taking the initiative to call the police regarding
the location of drug dens, had her spaza shoppetrol-bombed. She continued her activities and 
two months later she was mutilated by having acid thrown on her face (Maregele, 2012). A 
year earlier, the son of a 52 year old mother by the name of Rita Jacobs was murdered: she
was the founder of Seawinds Neighborhood Watch, receiving regular threats from local drug 
gangs. (Dolley, 2010)
Although the basic way illicit markets function has remained the same, with black market 
policies and police collusion remaining the operational catalyst, the nature of illicit 
commodities has changed dramatically. The most harmful substance in Overcome, due to the 
criminals it finances and the citizens it harms through both use and victimisation of others by 
users, is ‘tik’. The remainder of this section will give an overview of the 
destructivecommodity. 
The exact time of arrival in Cape Town is unknown, but it would be reasonable to assume 
that tik (also known as crystalmethamphetamine) arrived in the Western Cape a few years 
after the transition away from racial rule (Henda, 2012). It is relatively easy to make and most 
ingredients needed for its manufacturing can be bought over the counter. Since its 
introduction, it has ravaged entire communities and nowhere in South Africa is its usage 
comparable to the Cape Flats. Users have described it as the substance that speeds everything 
up and allows you to ‘keep going’. Others have spoken of using tik for days on end without 
the need to sleep. Within the context of Overcome, residents spoke of thieves using the drug 
at night before ‘getting to work’. The chemical is used as a stimulant believed to allow users 
to perform brash acts – be they brave or aggressive. Those on tik speak at a rapid pace, their 
bodies shake, their hands move seemingly without the user noticing it and it appears 
impossible to stand still. Majority of users in the community inhale the clear-white, odourless 
substance after putting its powdered form into a broken light bulbor glass pipe and holding 











shamelessmarketing ploy to attract children41. A 2008 Cape Flats study by the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) found that young girls were especially affected bythe spread of the 
new drug, and the most commonly cited method of acquiring the drug was in exchange for 
their bodies (Wechsberg, 2008). However, the social ills caused are much more numerous. 
In Overcome, residents see tik as the key illicit substance linked to anti-social behaviour. 
Such behaviour may manifest itself in the form of violence and it is commonly associated 
with personal and property theft. Those in Overcome who use tik are in constant search for 
their next fix, as life becomes a seemingly endless cycle of drug use and drug acquisition.
This theft leads to further violence as some angry residents who do not have faith in justice 
being delivered from the police violently claim their own justice from their perpetrators. It 
was very common to have jittery addicts come to Calvin’s shack trying desperately to sell 
whatever they had stolen or found. BlackBerry phones, with a retail value of around R2000 
had an asking price of R250. Brand name shoes were a commonly traded item. On one 
occasion two young men looking to acquire their drugs w re going from shack to shack, 
carrying the plastic shell of a hot tub. Anything and everything may be taken in an attempt to 
come by the funds needed to feed this powerful chemical dependency. Many residents are 
often disgruntled as their power is cut resulting from electric cable theft. It is thus not 
surprising that although there are no copper mines in the Western Cape, the province plays 
host toexporting vast quantities of the metal, so much so that the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry has been lobbying the government for the past year to rigorously increase 
regulations on the scrap metal industry and set up a commission of inquiry on copper theft in 
the Western Cape (Cape Chamber, 2011). Tik addicts are known for scavenging for the metal 
where ever it can be found, which they sell for very little to scrap metal businesseswho then
ship the metal abroad at an increased price. Last year an article by the Weekend Argus
reported that 88 meters of wire, worth R48,000, was stolen and sold for R80 (Weekend 
Argus, 2012). It also noted that the two months prior to the article being printed there had 
been 96 major incidents of cable theft in Cape Town.In the townships, tik addicts regularly
risk electrocution, climbing on to shack roofs, digging underground, or breaking-in,in order 
to strip electrical wire. 
                                                            











Tik use is on the rise: research by MRC shows that in 2003 there were 1724 people seeking 
medical help for their dependency while in 2008 this number rose to 2807, indicating an 
increase exceeding 60% (Plüddemann, 2008). The report goes on to state that “These findings 
are unprecedented in terms of the sharp increase in the number of patients seeking treatment 
for methamphetamine related problems.” Nearly all users recorded were from the Cape Flats.
The drug epidemic is stifling. Though correlations cannot be claimed, it is worth noting that 
drug related crimes in the Western Cape numbered 19,940 in 2004, increasing every year and 
arriving at 77,069 by 2012, marking an increase which exceeds 380% (South African Police 
Service, 2012). While other provinces saw an increase in drug related offences, none came 
close to the Western Cape’s 2011 figure, with KwaZulu-Natalplacing a distant second with 
37,415 offences in 2012. Below is the number of drug related offences reported at 
Muizenberg police station over the last 8 years(Ibid.):
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
132 239 228 185 215 185 269 357 359
On occasion a newspaper will print an article celebrating ‘drug busts’ in Seawinds. During 
March 2011 Die Burger published such an article: 
“The operation began on Saturday 12 March, at 16:10, when a house in Potberg 
Street was searched. A 42-year-old man was arrested after the discovery of 
Mandrax and tik. That same evening, at about 20:10, a house in Langeberg Street 
was searched and a 22-year-old man was arrested for the possession of 43 packets 
of tik. The operation was concluded with a follow-up raid in Potberg Street, where 
a 31-year-old suspect was arrested after being found in possession of a pistol 
stolen in Woodstock earlier this month. Drugs, including five large packets of tik, 
were also found in the man’s possession. ”(Fouché, 2011)
The article, titled “Police clean up on drugs”, and ending with a photo captioned 
“BUST: Warrant Officer Leon Verster with some of the goods confiscated”, either 
wilfully or ignorantly overlooks many underlying realities. One such reality is that the 
three people ‘busted’ all lived within a one minutewalking distance of eachother as the 
two short roads of Langberg and Potberg, being no longer than 200 meters each,
intersect each other, meaning that those arrested wereselling tik for the same gang. 
While many different independent sellers of marijuana may live close to eachother and 











the case, given the territorial wars that take place over competing markets, the area 
would be in daily shoot outs. The people who earn the lion’s share of the profits never 
get arrested and they have a lot of tik: even 100 packets of tik denote a ground level 
dealer. The small quantities which were reported to be confiscated further demonstrate
that the people arrested were not decision makers in the illicit market. It would be 
reasonable to assume that their boss simply went on to supply other people to act as 
drug outlets, as such positions are numerous in nature given resident’s amalgamation of 
desperation and fear. What the article also disregards in its celebratory tone is that it is 
inevitably the case that there are police officerswithin the same police station, although 
it may not be known who or how many, on the payroll of other drug dealers who were 













According to the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) website, under the heading ‘Vision 
and Mission’:
“The Constitution of the Republic of South African, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) lays 
down that the South African Police Service has a responsibility to 
• prevent, combat and investigate crime;
• maintain public order;
• protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and
• uphold and enforce the law.
• create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa.
• prevent anything that may threaten the safety or security of any community
• investigate any crimes that threaten the safety or security of any community
• ensure criminals are brought to justice; and
• participation in efforts to address the causes of crime
To fulfil in the Mission of the South African Police Service, all the members are 
subjected to a Code of Conduct.” (South African Police Service, 2012)
On the 31st of October, 1997, the South African Police Service officially introduced this
‘Code of Conduct’. One would imagine such literature to be lengthy, but in fact it is only 247 
words. Nonetheless, it would be of particular value to review the opening and closing lines of 
this document in order to try and understand to what standards the institution holds itself:
“I commit myself to creating a safe and secure environment for all people in 
South Africa by –participating in endeavours aimed at addressing the causes of 
crime; preventing all acts which may threaten the safety or security of any 
community; and investigating criminal conduct which endangers the safety or 
security of the community and bringing the perpetrators to justice. 
...I undertake to – ... act in a manner that is impartial, courteous, honest, 
respectful, transparent and accountable;exercise the powers conferred upon me in 
a responsible and controlled manner; andwork towards preventing any form of 
corruption and to bring the perpetrators thereof to justice.”(Ibid.)
Unfortunately for South African citizens who look to the police for protection, there is little 
recourse to ensure police are ethical agents.There are a host of inefficiencies associated with 
the SAPS and the following section will highlight those with links to criminality that breeds 











“Police corruption includes activities, both criminal and those construed as 
unethical or misconduct, but not illegal. The criminal activities by police members 
include crimes ranging from theft, taking bribes, to murder. The corrupt acts 
which are not illegal but are unethical, include dereliction of duty, excusing small 
transgressions, nepotism, and accepting gifts for favours, for example, free meals 
in return for ‘improved police visibility’ amongst others... Misconduct consists 
mainly of legal but unethical acts, whereas corruptionconsists of illegal and 
unethical acts.” (Grobler, 2009: 11)
The SAPS lag behind with many global best practices. Unlike Great Britain and the United 
States, where it was shown that the periodic transfer of officers from one station to another 
was a preventative of corruption, South African police are not rotated, allowing them to 
entrench themselves in criminal relationships and illicit dealings with greater ease (Ibid.: 
311). What is perhaps more troubling is the fact that police officers are transferred to other 
stations when they have been caught in criminal acts, which exasperates the problem by 
spreading it (Ibid.: 338) Unlike England or the United States, there is no integrity testing in 
the SAPS (Ibid: 268) and while laws exist in these countries which make it illegal for police 
to associate with gangsters and known criminals (Ibid.: 282), observingthe news reveals that 
the highest ranking police officials have friends who are powerful gangsters, such as Jackie 
Selebi, the police’s former top brass, and his working friendship with drug trafficker Glen 
Agliotti. On the lower end of the police hierarchy, observing places like Overcome quickly 
reveals that gangsters’drug dens are regularly frequented by friendly police business 
associates.  The Western Cape, which embodies many gangs and drug infested communities, 
is especially prone to working relationships between police and gangsters (Ibid.: 288).
Grobler argues that extortion in South Africa is highest in high crimes area (Ibid.: 305). This 
finding is supported internationally by the findings of Manning and Redlinger as well as 
those of the Mollen Commission. It is not surprising to find that 90% of Cape Flats residents 
believe police to be in business with gangsters (Ibid.: 288). Grobler writes “Police 
involvement in syndicates has been ascribed to the habit of many police members socialising 
with criminals” (Ibid.: 294), which surely has the effect of residents losing faith in the police. 
In Overcome, it seemed that many would rather turn to the gangsters they live withas 
opposed to the police they deem as corrupt and do not trust. In other violently impoverished 
communities, such as drug-ridden favelas in Brazil, this antagonism towards the police 











occurrence in Overcome. Grobler writes that in such communities, crime tends to be 
underreported due to a lack of faith in police(Grobler, 2009: 333). It was common for victims 
of crimes to forgo contacting the police; rather, many went to the strongmen in the 
community, like Calvin, to deal with many of their grievances which, in an ideal situation,
ought to have been handled by the police. 
Elizabeth Grobler’s PhD dissertation sheds new light on the understudied subject of 
contemporary police criminality in South Africa and confirms first hand findings regarding 
the relationship between gangster and police criminals. She emphasises managerial level 
failures within the policing institution as the leading factor in the seemingly free reign of 
police corruption in South Africa (Ibid.: Summary).  Her 2009 study is the most recent and 
in-depth in the field, filled with current facts and statistics. While there are numerous 
recorded cases relating to theft, murder, rape, drug use and sale, what is most illuminating is 
the number of cases against the police that result in acquittal. Telling of the policing 
institution’s inner workings, she references the Sunday Times in 2005, stating that:
“between 2000-2004, 53,740 police members had been arrested for criminal 
offences. An additional 6,132 were convicted, 9,699 were in the process of being 
prosecuted, and 37,918 were acquitted.” (Ibid.: 7)
Grobler’s work is also valuable in that it brings attention to many understudied police 
inefficiencies in South Africa, for example, how Cape Town police officers – paradoxically
from the Organised Crime Unit – became addicts after acting as ‘bait’ for drug dealing gangs
(Ibid.: 47). While this particular case was reported, one can only guess at the number of 
police addicts who continue to feed their chemical dependence at their work place. It was not 
unusual to see police officers with known drug dealers in Overcome: on one occasion in late 
2010, two were seen posing with smoking pipes, holding up gangs signs for photos on their 
phones in a place considered by the police to be a drug den. Grobler’s research also indicates 
an increasing problem with police officers becoming drug addicts, perhaps providing another 
avenue for cooperation between drug dealers and police. 
The relationships between private and public criminals are vast and wide ranging. Police may 
drive drug dealers to deliver their commodities and even do the deliveries themselves (Ibid.: 
375).Grobler also explains how gang informants are paid by police who inflate the fee which 











informants’ fee for themselves (Ibid.: 57). She highlights the extent of police leaking 
information to criminals and their social relationships with known gangsters(Ibid.: 82). Police 
have also been known to pass information to criminals regarding witnesses set to testify 
against them, putting the lives of such witnesses in imminent danger(Ibid.: 83). Indeed, in the 
case of Calvin, the second theory regarding his murder was that rival gangsters had found out 
that he had been a witness to a gang murder, the trial for which was approaching. This is not 
unusual; currently a Cape Flats boss in the 28s gang is under trial for 21 murders committed 
over the last 6 years, many of them committed for the purpose of silencing witnesses (Dolley,
2012). Grobler notes that police are known to keep their gangster associates out of prison 
long enough for them to eliminate witnesses before their trials (Grobler, 2009: 305), 
perpetuating their violent activities which endanger residents, reconfirming once again 
gangster impunity and police alliances that maintain residents’ sense of insecurity. All in all, 
Grobler’s research demonstrates that police, individually and in gr ups, are involved in a 
multitude of crimes, ranging from murder, to rape, theft, child trafficking,drug dealing, 
weapons sales and much in between, breeding violence in collaboration with drug dealers
who are their criminal counterparts in the private realm.
Given the multitude and nature of these criminal acts, Grobler gathers that is not a case of a 
few ‘bad apples’ but rather the entire policing institution is flawed (Ibid.: 91). She emphasises 
the fact that poor management, an inadequate promotion structure, and low pay leads many 
police astray. One of Grobler’s interviewees, a police officer imprisoned for corruption, said 
“we must work for ourselves because the money is not enough” (Ibid.: 389). The relationship 
between insufficient wages and police criminality has been observed locally and globally. 
Mark Shaw wrote that criminal groups “have the ability to `buy into' government and bribe 
officials including those in law enforcement who earn comparatively little” (Shaw, 1996: 54). 
The extensive1994report titled Commission to investigate allegations of police corruption 
and the anti-corruption procedures of the Police Department, set up by the City of New 
York, confirmed the same findings in the United States. In South Africa, police convicted of 
corruption predominantly justified their deeds in relation to low pay42 (Grobler, 2009: 314). 
                                                            
42It must almost be taken into account that the people hired by government institutions for-low level jobs are 
commonly from poor socio-economic backgrounds. It is not uncommon to hear of forest rangers that try to 
take advantage of money offered by rhino poachers (Dardagan, 2012), or government nurses taking hundreds 
of thousands of rands worth of medicine from the hospital for private sale (News24, 2012). The same reality 
applies to the economically restrained people working for the government in the policing, security and judicial 











Though this alone cannot account for why police turn to criminality, low pay becomes an 
even greater factor when police are overworked: South African detectives handle an average 
of 80 dockets per month while the international average is 24 (Ibid.: 320). Grobler writes that 
60-80% of police worksecond jobs due to the inability to make financial ends meet (Ibid.: 
136).The SAPS are recruiting from a poor population surviving in a depressed job market, 
meaning many join simply for pay and to have a job, as opposed to looking for a career 
aimed at bettering society (Ibid.: 327). Gareth Newman echoes this point when he writes:
“Many people will join the police agency not for vocational reasons, but because 
personal issues to do with status, power, access to weapons or merely because it is 
a job”(Newman, 2002: 8)
Such recruits, Grobler adds, tend to be poorly educated and she argues that poorly educated 
officers are the ones most likely to have corrupt tendencies, both locally and 
abroad(Ibid.:328).
Another widely cited cause of police corruption is due to the relationship between police and 
drug informants (Ibid.: 132). Manning and Redlinger demonstrate that this is an international 
problem when they state “Agent corruption is a product of the requirements of narcotic law 
enforcement and a theme found in the history of the enforcement enterprise” (Redlinger, 
1976: 5) Manning and Redlinger's believe that “Informants are the heart of the enforcement 
of narcotics law (Ibid.: 8) and that 
“narcotics law enforcement is such that rather than providing inducement to 
conformity to the law, it is more likely to underscore the virtues of avoidance of 
the more obvious requirements of law enforcement.” (Ibid.:6)
In South Africa, narcotics enforcement is even more flawed. There are no checks or balances 
in place, as there are in Europe and North America, to ensure proper handling of informants 
(Grobler, 2009: 300), which is all the worse given the fact that “narcotic law enforcement is 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
attempted murders and murders, according to an internal audit (Standing, 2006). This figure only accounts for 
1994 and 2001. Another police commissioned investigation of missing dockets revealed that between April 
2008 and February 2009 alone 688 dockets went “missing” (Omar, 2009): this is an ‘industry’ figure and one 
has to wonder if the actual number is higher. Reports of such theft occasionally surfaces in the news and most 
recently, in July 2012, the Bellville Commercial Crimes Court heard of a prosecutor working at the Bellville 
magistrate’s court, selling dockets for as little as R1800 relating to crimes such as the arrest of an individual –











virtually always secretive, duplicitous and quasi-legal and is extremely difficult to effectively 
regulate” (Redlinger, 1976: 5). Grobler quotes a police interviewee saying:
“A crooked informer will always have a hold on a crooked cop. The relationship 
exists beyond this because the cop will not be able to arrest his informer. 
Information provided by this informer boosts the cop’s career but the informer is a 
crook, they are dependent on each other” (Grobler, 2009: 301)
This a sentiment shared by the Major General Vearey (Vearey, 2011) and a reality made 
more likely due to low police wages. These findings make lighter work of understanding the 
dangerous workings between police and drug dealers in Overcome. 
Veareyalso believes that there exists a systematic relationship between gangsters and corrupt
South African police. The bulk of violence in Overcome is controlled by the gangs and the 
gang’s dominance is vested in the drug market which they run with the help of police.
Without such assistance they would be arrested: community members know where the drugs 
are kept, who sells them and what they sell, though they lack confidence in the police to do 
much about it and often fear what may happen if they approach those who they may regard as 
the gangsters’ government partners. 
Major GeneralVeareyidentified police corruption in the context of townships into two 
categories: petty crime such as when a police officer leaves the scene of a crime with more 
items missing than when she or he had arrived, which is more common amongst young 
officers and gang-level corruption which takes place in higher-up, more specialised units. 
Although he believes he commands one of the most efficient units in the Western Cape, when 
asked if there was corruption at his station, he flatly replied “Yup.” In the last three years, 
fifteen officers there had been arrested. When asked the reason for the arrests, he replied 
“Drugs.” (Vearey, 2011)
Some officers, Vearey said, believe that becoming a police is the “best opportunity” for 
criminality.Given the violent nature of Cape Town’s poor drug markets, the opportunism of a 
few causes suffering for the masses.Much of the criminal workingsbetween police and 
gangsters observed in Overcomewere reconfirmed by Major General Vearey. Establishing the 
bonds between police and organised criminals is a game of patience, relationship-building, 











hierarchy of the police and gangs, a common one which was described by both campsworked
in the following way. It usually involveda cop within a specialised unit such as the Crime 
Prevention Unit (CPU) which isthe active, on-the-ground arm of the SAPS, conducting
patrols and visible policing. “It’s what they’re interested in which determines who they 
corrupt” Veareyexplained, adding that the gangsters are interested in:
“any police operation that is going to take place, so the person they’re going to 
target isn’t going to be an ordinary constable that’s going to be a part of the 
operation because that person is least likely to have the information they need in 
terms of which addresses the police will come to.” (Vearey, 2011)
It’s the CPU which holds this information and thus it is they who are infiltrated. It begins by 
gangsters presenting themselves as police informers. However, as confirmed by both state
officers and street criminals, gangsters do not simply corrupt police; police also coerce 
gangsters (Vearey, 2011). In fact, Grobler’s findings were that when it comes to the 
corruption of police, no one is more effective or efficient in proliferating the institutional
inefficiency more that police officers who are seeking to introduce new police officers to 
their private criminal partners (Grobler, 2009: 418). Her thesis revealed that those most often 
responsible for ‘corrupting’ police officers are other police officers.
“A gang leader would send you five informants” explains Vearey “and they would target 
specific people in the station to give you information”. The gangsters disclose information
pertaining to criminal activities –drugs, murders, weapons – which incriminate competing 
gangs. The immediate result for the co-operating gang is that their market share increases, 
while the rank of the police officer rises as a result of a ‘successful bust’. What follows is that 
the police officer is promoted to an elite unit, gaining access to sensitive information
pertaining to gang activities as a supposed gang expert, and becoming more useful for their 
gangster partners. “Meanwhile, they’re basically being controlled”, says Vearey. The 
gangsters’ investment flourishes. The police are now dependent on gangsters for recognition 
and promotion and the prestige and pay increases that ultimately follow. Referring again to 
Manning and Redlinger’s findings in 1976, they write:
“Internal pressures for excessive enforcement are created by: (1) aspirations for 
promotion, salary and "easy numbers" within the unit; (2) quotas for arrests or 












It isambitious officers who are looking for positive statistics, and the disgruntled, under-
appreciated and disheartened employees,who are prime targets thatGrobler revealed are 
plentiful amongst South African police.However, within the highest ranks of the state’s 
security institutions similar trends of criminal activity persist43.  
What Vearey, Van Onselen, and Kinnes explained to the author about the relationship 
between gangsters and police, historically and contemporarily, resonated with the behaviours 
observed while living with the veteran gangster Calvin. For example, Calvin used to pay off
police officers from neighbouring areas and in return the policeman would give Calvin raid 
warnings44. There were social visits which resembled friendly extortion. People who spent 
their days in Calvin’s shack naturally looked out for the police. Verbal and physical signals, 
such as code words and hand signs, communicated to others the p lice’s arrival, at which 
point illicit commodities were hidden or taken offsite. Police visited often. Regardless of how 
irritated Calvin may have been about being pressured to pay, he would act cool and the 
representative of the state always left with marijuana, music, a cool drink, or a combination 
thereof. Interestingly, after he was gunned down by the area’s leading tik gang, his wife, 
ceasingto recompense police bribery, no longer received her husband’s police perks and has 
since been repeatedly arrested for being in possession of marijuana, put in jail, sent to court
and told to pay the court for the marijuana she had in her position. The average fine of R300
is almost unaffordable for her, but since the only way she can feed her family is by
continuing to do the only work she knows how, she continues, knowing she will be squeezed 
for cash by the courts again.
                                                            
43Jackie Selebi, the former national commissioners of the South African Police Service and president of 
Interpol, was convicted in December 2011 for corruption – having received money from a convicted drug 
smuggler – only to be released for ‘medical reasons’ less than 8 months after the conviction (Cape Times, 
2012). Vearey believes that Selebi’s case is typical of criminal side dealings with gangsters (Vearey, 2011). 
Salebi’s replacement, Bheki Cele, was quickly suspended after corruption charges. Collusion between the 
middle-ranks in the police institution is not uncommon either. A 2004 court case heard how numerous Cape 
Town police officers were on the payroll of drug-gang boss Quinton “Mr. Big” Marinus; it was common for the 
gangster to order drugs, then call contacts in the police to intercept the delivery, confiscating the narcotics and 
freeing the deliverer, only to go on and sell the drugs to Marinus at low rates (Maughan, 2004). Indeed, in the 
townships too, low-ranking police officers have been known to sell illegal substances to gangsters.  
44This is a common practice internationally, it seems, as Madding and Redlinger wrote in 1976 that “First, there 
is a payoff to officers from dealers for advance-warning information concerning raids, or other such warning 
information. This type of payoff is made on a regular basis. Secondly, there are payoffs made at the time of a 











Veareyexplained that the law used to work in a way that many of the top gangsters in the 
Cape could never get arrested because they were the informants of police; therefore, when 
they were taken to court the police working with them would tell the court that the gangster 
had informer immunity. When asked “What if the guy is going around murdering people?”he 
replied “In most of these things, it’s the value of the target beyond that determines what the 
person gets... It’s who they want – who the police want – afterwards that determines what the
value of what you get” (Vearey, 2011).
Vearey went on to say that the relationship changes when the police profit with the criminals. 
In 1997, his superior handed him about 14,000 dockets, dating from 1980 to 1997, relating to 
the gangsters protected by this relationship. Vearey was to arrest as many of them as he could 
as the police had admitted that the system had given rise to severe “corruption”, mimicking 
moves by the police in the early 1900s when Smuts cleaned out the police force due to the 
relationship brewed between police and criminals over illicit commodities (Onselen, 1982: 
16).Vearey then went onto reiterate that in the couple of decades before the collapse of racial 
apartheid, gangs were politically aligned with the police and used as hit squads against anti-
ANC forces in exchange for the privilege of keepingtheir violence-brewing businesses 
running. The relationship’s currency may have changed, but the relationship has not 
ceased.Standing writes:
“What is clear is that police corruption is inadequately ‘policed’. Establishedin 
1995, the SAPS internal anti-corruption unit was downgraded in 2003 
andintegrated into th  Organized Crime Unit. The reason for this remains 
unclear as the anti-corruption unit managed to increase the number of successful 
prosecutions against policeofficers by 600%45.” (Standing, 2006: 147)
For each reported case, it is probable that many more go unreported. Gangsters and other 
criminal entities have described to the author numerous instances of paying someone – a 
clerk, an office worker, a police officer with connections, or someone with some sort of 
institutional tie – to do things like‘vanish dockets’. It iswell cited that policesell confiscated 
substances to friendly gangs,which Manning and Redlinger find particularly troubling as this 
act actually makes the police marketers of narcotics (Redlinger, 1976: 9). Police officers have 
actually assisted gangsters in raiding police barracks for weapons: this happened in 2000 
                                                            
45 Two years after Jackie Selebi came into power the unit was disbanded, possibly shedding some light as to 











when the Hard Livings gang was assisted by the police in this endeavour at the Faure police 
base (Standing, 2003: 5). In October 2012 the Western Cape police commissioner, Arno 
Lamoer,finally took heed of Grobler’s findings and admitted that there was a serious problem 
with the violence nurtured through police’s relationships with gangs, saying that in the last 
year 87 police officers were arrested for selling guns to gangsters and armed robberies. In the 
last 3 years, he noted, 159 police weapons had been lost or ‘gone missing’ and this does not 
include unofficial guns held in police locks ups(Johns, 2012).
The material resources which exchange hands between government agents and state outlaws 
need not be grand, as the quality and quantity of those exchanges are dependent on the actors 
involved. Therefore, the regular handing over of a music CD, can of cool drink, or the 
‘gifting’ of a ‘stoop’ of marijuana (street valueR5), is as typical as the same police officers 
selling these materials elsewhere for cash. These kinds of dealings, according to Elizabeth 
Grobler, qualify as acts of police corruption,fostering unhealthy relationships, lending 
support to the criminals who create a state of unpredictability, vulnerability and violence for 
people living in drug markets like Overcome (Grobler, 2009: 12). Standing believes that:
“The genesis of this corruption may lie in the propensity for police to seek 
additionalincome and to extend their local power; and for organised crime, on the 
otherhand, to find ways of managing insecurity. (Standing, 2006: 139)”
As discussed earlier, Charles Van Onselen records that as early as the 19th century the sale of 
illegal commodities was dependent on being in business with the police, both low and high 
ranking (Onselen, 1982: 81). From taking out competitors, making evidence and witnesses 
disappear, raid-warnings, gun sales, witness assassinations, and more. South African 
policeprofiteering side by side with gangsters is as old as South African gangsterism itself
(Ibid: 85). It is interesting to note that over a century ago, in 1899, a move was made by the 
government to supplement the wages of police while separating them from the prosecuting 
Attorney General’s office in order to create greater ethical oversight. The result was a 
dramatic decrease in corruption and an increased ability to combat gang activity. When this 
policy was disbanded, however, illicit sales reached a new high (Ibid.: 72) “and in the lower 












In light of all these historic and contemporary findings, it may be argued that without police 
inefficiencies, the violence which is derived from the relationship between public and private 
criminals would decreaseand that illicit markets would cease to function as they do today. 
Indeed, a high ranking police interviewee of Andre Standing stated “Corruption is our biggest 













This thesis has demonstrated the development of gangsterism, police criminality and the 
proliferation of violent illicit markets which have aided the relationship being formed 
between the two parties. Certain historical junctures have been argued to have attributed to 
the growth of this partnership. The relationship has been shown to foster volatility and 
violence in Overcome where most of the violence is conducted and controlled by gangs. 
Today, their power and influence is vested in the selling of government banned substances. 
Some of these substances decay the lives of already desperate people, forcing them into a life 
of criminality in order to feed their addiction. Hopeless addicts prey on other people living in 
the poor communities, committing crimes against them so they can get their drugs. At other 
times, addicts give their criminal services over to gangs in direct exchange for narcotics; such 
is often the case with child assassins. In these communities, the brave fewwho speak out 
against the gangs risk their own lives and of those close to them. People do not feel safe in 
their communities and many feel that there is no justice or recourse, owning to the power and 
influence of the gangs allied with police. Residents find rest hard to find even at night time 
because it is not guaranteed that the hours of darkness will be quiet: helplessly locked in their 
shacks, it is common to hear neighbours struggle against intruders. Living in such 
circumstances weighs heavily on the populace.  
The police know which gangsters are doing what, and where they are doing it. It may be 
argued that without police corruption, the drug market would cease to exist as it does.The 
gangs cannot conduct or grow their business without the permission and support of the 
police. The police are seemingly always on the payroll of drug dealers. If there is to be a raid 
of a drug dealers premises, their police contacts give them a grace period to move. When the 
drug dealers may seem like they are caught and are goingto be imprisoned, bringing their 
violence-breeding activities to a halt, their police connections will manipulate state offices to 
clear charges. At other times the police sell drugs and weapons to gangsters in order to grow
their mutually beneficial business, deliver drugs for them, or take out competing gangs. Both 
the criminals of the underworld and those of the state are driven by money:ultimately, human 
suffering is a non-factor. It is this indivisible relationship between police, gangs, and the drug 
commodity which ensure poor communities like Overcome remain unpredictable, violent 
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